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ABSTRACT 
Predictive Content of Portfolio Flows for the Real Economy 
Golnaz Baradaran Motie 
The aim of this dissertation is to study predictive content of foreign portfolio investment and its 
components for the real economy of the US and the UK. Despite the large volume of foreign 
portfolio investment, there are limited studies of how advanced economies are affected by portfolio 
inflow. Empirical studies show that the effect of portfolio inflows on growth in emerging 
economies is low, possibly due to underdeveloped financial infrastructure. The first chapter 
estimates show a positive and significant long-run effect of 0.7 percentage points on US real GDP 
following a one standard deviation shock to foreign portfolio investment. Further estimates reveal 
that positive shocks to portfolio equity and debt inflows also affect the US economy positively in 
the long-run.  
The second chapter forecasts US GDP using capital flow variables. Capital flow series have been 
mainly overlooked in the forecasting of US real GDP. The study applies the three-pass regression 
filter (3PRF) method to forecast US real GDP by using capital flow as well as trade series. It uses 
mean square forecast error (MSFE) metric to evaluate the performance of 3PRF forecasts in 
comparison to autoregressive (AR) and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models. The results 
show that out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts perform better than AR forecasts by at least 13 percent in 
shorter horizons. In-sample and out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts that use capital flow and trade 
variables perform better than benchmark models in all forecasting horizons. 
The third chapter studies the effects of foreign portfolio investment and its components, equity and 
debt, on the UK Economy. Foreign portfolio investment in the UK has increased over the years 
and it currently accounts for 37 percent of total foreign investment in the UK, over $10 trillion at 
the end of 2016. Limited studies on advanced economies and the results of the first chapter that 
show portfolio investment and its components have positive effects on US real GDP in the long-
run are the motivations for this chapter. This chapter investigates whether the positive effects of 
portfolio investment are unique to the US by studying the UK. The structural VAR estimates show 
that one standard deviation shock to portfolio investment has a positive effect of UK GDP. Equity 
inflow, similar to the US case, has a positive and significant effect on the UK economy. A debt 
inflow shock shows a negative effect on the UK GDP and investment in the post-financial crisis 
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Chapter 1:  Foreign Portfolio Investment and US 
Output 
1.1. Introduction 
Foreign investment in the US is at an all-time high. At the end of the first quarter of 2017 
it reached over $24 trillion, more than 70 percent of which was portfolio investment. The effect of 
international capital inflow on emerging economies has been extensively studied highlighting 
important aspects of international capital inflow and their impacts on those economies.1 Although 
multiple studies include advanced economies in their panels for comparison purposes, very few 
papers focus on the impact of foreign capital flows on advanced economies in general and on the 
US in particular2,3. This chapter contributes to the literature by studying how foreign portfolio 
investment in the US has changed over time and how it affects US real GDP.  
We use structural VAR models to estimate the dynamic effect of capital inflow on US 
GDP. There are two advantages to this approach. First, it allows for feedback effects between the 
variables of interest. Second, it allows us to study the short-term and long-term effects of shocks 
to capital inflow variables on US GDP. We also compare our main results with local projection 
                                               
1 See Bosworth and Collins (1999) for the saving and investment implications of capital flows, Prasad et al. 
(2007) for the relationship between financial market development and the beneficial effect of foreign capital on 
growth and Blanchard et al. (2016) for how debt versus non-debt portions of capital inflow can affect growth 
differently. They found that increases in debt and non-debt capital inflows have contractionary and expansionary 
effects, respectively. 
2 Durham (2003) shows statistically insignificant effect of portfolio inflow and negative effect of bank lending 
on growth. Aizenman et al. (2013) show the positive effect of FDI and equity investments and the insignificant 
impact of short term debt on economic growth. 
3 Warnock and Warnock (2009) analyze the impact of international capital inflow on US long-term interest rates. 
They showed that US long-term interest rates would have been 80 basis points higher in the absence of 
international capital inflow for one year. 
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impulse responses that are known to be robust to lag misspecifications. Finally, we use factor 
augmented VAR (FAVAR) to investigate whether the inclusion of US monetary policy affects our 
main results. 
Our standard structural VAR impulse responses show that positive shocks to portfolio 
inflow and its components have positive impacts on US GDP in the long-run. We find that a one 
standard deviation shock to portfolio inflow increases US GDP by 0.7 percentage points after eight 
quarters. Additionally, we find that one standard deviation shocks to portfolio debt inflow and 
portfolio equity inflow increase US GDP by 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, after two 
years. Local projection and standard VAR impulse responses show similar effects on US GDP two 
years after capital inflow shocks. Finally, our FAVAR results indicate that US GDP responses to 
capital inflow shocks remain positive and significant despite the inclusion of US monetary policy 
factors. 
The primary contribution of this study is empirically supporting the hypothesis that 
portfolio inflows have been beneficial to the US economy. We use disaggregated US financial 
accounts data to study not only the effect of portfolio inflow and its components, debt and equity, 
on US GDP but also how shocks to their sub-categories such as US corporate debt and US 
government debt impact the US economy in the long-run. The estimates show positive long-term 
effects across most categories. Our approach to use structural VAR models to allow for feedback 
effects rather than single equation instrumental variables (i.e. Blanchard et al. (2016), Durham 
(2003) and Prasad et al. (2007)) enables us to estimate the dynamic effects of capital inflow on US 
GDP. Additionally, we carefully check for the sensitivity of our estimates. We address the 
sensitivity of standard impulse responses to misspecification as suggested by Kilian (2001) and 
estimate local projection impulse responses robust to VAR model misspecifications. We also 
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check for omitted variable bias by adding US interest rates to our core VAR variables. We use 
factor-augmented VAR models to show that our main results hold even after controlling for US 
monetary policy effects. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In section 1.2, we present the empirical 
background on international capital flows. In section 1.3, we explain structural VARs and 
identification strategies that we use to study dynamic effects of foreign investment and its 
components on US GDP. In section 1.4, we describe data sources available on international capital 
flow and foreign investment, focusing on the data series we use and their characteristics. In section 
1.5, we present the impulse responses associated with structural VARs. We present the local 
projection impulse responses in section 1.6. We add five US interest rates and use the FAVAR 
method to investigate the effect of US monetary policy on our main results and report the impulse 
responses in section 1.7. We conclude in section 1.8. 
1.2. Empirical Background on International Capital Flows  
In this section, we discuss multiple aspects of international capital flows. Section 1.2.1 
overviews different capital flow variables used in the literature. We compare different components 
of foreign investment in the US and how they have changed over time in section 1.2.2. Finally, we 
describe the recent literature about the effect of capital flow on growth in section 1.2.3. 
1.2.1. Capital Flows: Net versus Gross 
To study the effect of capital inflow we first need to define capital inflow. There are 
different series used in the literature to measure capital inflow. In earlier studies, the current 
account deficit was used. For example, Higgins and Klitgaard (1998) consider the US current 
account deficit as a measure for US capital inflow. They suggest that US current account deficits 
should be seen as net capital inflows that promote growth in the United States. They argue that US 
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economy benefits from the inflow of foreign capital because it allows domestic investments to 
increase even if private savings are decreasing. Conversely, Obstfeld (2012) highlights the fact 
that there is an undeniable relationship between current account imbalances and global financial 
instability. Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of considering both current account 
imbalances and gross international financial flows in assessing financial stability risks.  
Capital flow literature is divided between studies that only focus on net capital inflows and 
papers that consider both net and gross capital inflows. Ferreira and Laux (2009) and Aizenman et 
al. (2010) belong to the former group. Ferreira and Laux (2009) study the impact of net portfolio 
flows on growth of 50 countries and show that openness to portfolio flows have positive effects 
on economic growth. Aizenman et al. (2010) study the effect of external financing, including net 
FDI inflows, net portfolio inflows and net bank lending inflows, on output volatility in developing 
countries. They find higher net portfolio inflows and net bank lending inflows increase a country’s 
likelihood of output volatility. 
Studies belong to the latter group either consider both net and gross capital inflows or only 
focus on gross inflows. Broner et al. (2013) study the behavior of gross capital flows during 
financial crises. They show that gross capital flows are more volatile and more pro-cyclical 
compared to net capital flows. They find that gross inflows and gross outflows both shrink during 
crises. Forbes and Warnock (2012) differentiate gross capital inflow from gross capital outflow in 
their study of the dynamics of capital flow waves. They explain that domestic and foreign investors 
can respond differently to shocks as they face different exposures to domestic exchange rate or 
have different access to liquidity.  
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We follow recent literature by using gross capital inflow variables instead of net. The only 
difference is that we use US financial accounts level data instead of flow data. Our dataset is 
disaggregated and allows us to investigate the effect of each category on US GDP.  
1.2.2. US Capital Flows 
Total foreign investment in the US reached $24.5 trillion by the end of the first quarter of 
2017.3 The following figures help us understand how foreign investment and its components have 
changed over time. 
Figure 1-1 shows how foreign investment positions in the US have changed over time. 
There are two points to note. Firstly, net foreign investment in the US grew significantly after 
financial crisis and it reached $5.8 trillion dollars in 2016 Q1. Secondly, since 2008 the gap 
between capital inflow and outflow has continued to widen. In the first quarter of 2016 gross 
capital inflow and outflow level were $23.2 and $17.3 trillion dollars, respectively. 
The current value of US assets held by foreigners reached the value of US nominal GDP 
in 2010 Q1 and has outgrown US output ever since. That is a crucial point that could be overlooked 
if one only looks at the net capital inflow in their analysis. Figure 1-2 portrays components of 
capital inflow level as percentage of gross capital inflow level. Portfolio investment level has shot 
up since mid-1990s whereas FDI and bank lending inflow shares decreased over time. It is clear 
that the main contributor in the growth of total foreign investment in the US is the portfolio 
investment component. Figure 1-3 shows that portfolio investment accounts for more than 70 
percent of total foreign investment in the US between 2011 and 2016 compared to only 54 percent 
                                               
3 That is the lower bound of total foreign investment where foreign direct investment is valued on current-cost 
basis. If foreign direct investment is measured at market-value, total US liabilities for the same period goes up 
to almost $33 trillion according to US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
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between 1977 and 1990. This confirms that the level of foreign portfolio investment in the US has 
grown significantly compared to FDI and bank credit level.  
Now we study whether all components of portfolio investment contribute to this surge 
equally. Figure 1-4 answers that question by plotting debt and equity inflows as a percentage of 
portfolio investment level. The debt component is dominant and in the first quarter of 2016 is 
accounted for more that 60 percent of foreign portfolio investment in the United States. 
Although both equity and debt sit in the liabilities section of financial accounts they are 
very different in nature. Equity accounts for the value of US stocks owns by foreigners who can 
claim them at any given time. Also, stock holders share profits and losses through fluctuations in 
stock price and dividends. Debt portion of portfolio investment, however, includes US corporate 
and government debts and their associated interest rates that need to be paid in full at some point 
in the future. 
The continuous increase in debt portion of portfolio investment raises the question whether 
US debt level is sustainable. Haque et al. (2015) examine sustainability of US current account 
deficit. They show that multiple factors such as economic conditions in the rest of the world and 
in China and valuation effects can impact sustainability of US external debt. The authors consider 
different debt measurements and report that while debt to GDP ratio seems sustainable, debt to 
government spending appears unsustainable. Evans (2017) studies the accumulation of external 
debt in the US and shows that the growing net foreign liability moved toward steady state before 
1990s and away from steady state since mid 1990s. His model reveals that increasing net foreign 
liability and declining net export to GDP ratio could only be sustainable if agents expected that 
US current account would improve significantly in the near future. His findings are in line with 
earlier papers (see Evans (2017)’s references such as Summers, 2004; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007 
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and Backus et al., 2009) that conclude current account deficit cannot go on indefinitely and 
eventually either net exports should increase, or agents will adjust their expectations. 
Another important question is how the increasing US external debt affects US growth. 
Does US government debt and US corporate debt have similar effects on US GDP? We find that 
a positive shock to US external debt has a positive effect on US output. However, it is US corporate 
debt that carries the larger portion of that positive effect. Therefore, it seems that US corporate 
debt is growing as a necessity for US growth rather than a burden. 
1.2.3. Capital Flows, Growth and Comparison with This Study 
There is a division between the effect of capital inflow on growth that theory suggests and 
what policy makers in emerging economies believe (Blanchard et al., 2016). Theory suggests that 
an increase of capital inflow into a country with flexible exchange rate policy puts upward pressure 
on domestic currency. Therefore, domestic currency appreciates, and the country’s current account 
deteriorates, reducing GDP if the money supply remains unchanged. In practice, an ongoing flow 
of foreign capital into a country also puts downward pressure on domestic interest rates, elevating 
investment and output. 
Capital flows in general and portfolio flows in particular are regarded as cause for concern 
in the literature. Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) break down the reasons behind capital 
controls to four fears: fear of appreciation, fear of hot money, fear of large inflows and fear of loss 
of monetary autonomy. De la Torre, Didier and Pienknagura (2012) highlight that instability and 
uncertainty associated with capital flow fluctuations can have long-lasting adverse effects on 
income.  
Durham (2003) examines the effect of foreign portfolio investment and bank lending on 
economic growth of 88 countries from 1977 to 2000. His estimations show that portfolio 
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investments and foreign bank lending have negative impacts on growth. However, he mentions 
that his results might be affected by simultaneity bias given the use of simultaneous equations. The 
author shows that one percentage point increases in the ratio of portfolio investments to GDP and 
foreign bank lending as percentage of GDP reduce average growth rates by 1.4 and 0.2 percentage 
points, respectively. We use structural VAR where each variable is a linear function of lags of 
itself as well as lags of all other variables. This method allows us to study the effect of structural 
shocks to foreign portfolio investment and its components on US GDP. 
Prasad et al. (2007) show that among 59 nonindustrial countries those that relied less on 
foreign capital have grown faster than those that have relied more. They also argue that 
underdeveloped financial markets are the main obstacles that prevent developing economies from 
channeling the foreign capital into the local economy efficiently. They conclude that developing 
countries would benefit from slow and cautious capital integrations when they are open to the type 
of capital that their economies are capable to absorb and more vigilance toward less absorbable 
foreign capital. Meanwhile, local financial markets might benefit from a grace period that allows 
them to develop before liberalization of capital movements. Their estimations show that if current 
account balance improves by one percentage point, economic growth goes up by around 0.1 
percentage point. It is important to note that their findings are mainly for nonindustrial countries. 
Prasad et al. (2007)’s argument that underdeveloped financial markets in developing 
countries is the main reason why they struggle to fully absorb the benefits of financial liberalization 
stresses the importance of studying the impact of capital flows on developed countries like the 
United States. By looking at the effect of foreign capital on the US economy, developing countries 
can project the benefit of financial development against its potential cost and make informed 
decisions on financial liberalization. 
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Warnock and Warnock (2009) study the effect of international capital inflow on US long-
term interest rates by looking at the effect of foreign-purchased US government bonds on 10-year 
Treasury yield. They predict that if there were no foreign purchases of US government bonds for 
one year, long-term rates would have been 80 basis points higher. They also find similar effects 
on US mortgage rates and other long-term interest rates. Warnock and Warnock only focus on the 
effect of US government bonds held by foreigners whereas we look at various components of 
foreign investments in the United States. Their study was conducted before the recent financial 
crisis, so it does not include post-financial crisis period. Our sample covers pre- and post- financial 
crisis.  
Ferreira and Laux (2009) examine the impact of portfolio flows on growth of 50 countries, 
including advanced and less-developed countries, from 1988 to 2000. They find that openness to 
portfolio flows has positive effects on economic growth. They show that positive effects of net 
equity inflow on growth is greater for less-developed countries. They report that one percent 
increase in the lagged net sale of local equities by local residents increases advanced and 
developing countries’ GDP growth by 0.2 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively. They mainly 
focus on the effect of net portfolio flows on growth. Our study concentrates on the effect of gross 
portfolio inflow and its components. Our sample also includes the recent financial crises.  
Aizenman et.al (2013) study the effect of international capital flows on economic growth 
of 100 countries between 1990 and 2010. They find a significant and stable relationship between 
FDI and growth. However, the relationships between portfolio flows and growth are shown to be 
less stable. They find one standard deviation increase in FDI inflow and outflow increase growth 
rate of GDP per capita by 1.8 and 12.1 percentage points, respectively. Aizenman et al. (2013) also 
show that one standard deviation increases of FDI inflow, equity investment and short-term debt 
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during pre-crisis period increase GDP per capita growth by 0.9, 0.4 and zero percentage points, 
respectively.  
Blanchard et al. (2015) develop an extension to the Mundell Fleming model to study 
whether an increase of capital inflow has a positive or a negative effect on economic growth. They 
show that dividing the capital inflow into bond flows and non-bond flows can explain the conflict 
between theory and what policymakers believe. Their empirical results show that increases in non-
bond flows and bond flows have positive and negative impacts on output, respectively. They use 
instrumental variables to resolve the endogeneity issue. In this chapter, we use structural VAR 
models where all variables are assumed to be endogenous. An important contribution of this study 
is to use disaggregated quarterly data that covers the pre- and post-financial crisis period, so we 
can study the effect of shocks to sub-categories of capital inflow on US GDP. 
1.3. Structural VAR Models 
There is significant evidence in literature suggesting that domestic GDP is one of the main 
determinants of capital inflow into a country (e.g. De Vita and Kyaw (2008)). There are also 
studies that investigated the effect of capital inflow on domestic economy and found significant 
results (e.g. Blanchard et al. (2016)), so feedback effects are important. In this chapter, we use a 
structural VAR model where all variables are assumed to be endogenous. Structural VAR allows 
us to study the dynamic effects of foreign investment shocks on US output. Each model contains 
lags of US GDP growth on the right hand-side, including trade variables as components of GDP. 
Therefore, the estimated effects are beyond the effects of trade on US GDP growth. In our models, 




A Vector Autoregression (VAR) model introduced by Sims (1980), can be explained as a 
system of linear multivariate regressions where all variables are treated as endogenous and each 
variable is a function of lagged values of all other endogenous variables in the system. Our reduced 
form VAR models are based on quarterly data from 1980 Q1- 2016 Q1 and are defined as follows: 
!" = $% + $'!"(' + $)!"() + ⋯+ $+!"(+ + ,"                                                                     (1.1) 
Where !- = (/0-, /2- ,… /4-)6 is a vector of 7 variables at time 8, $9 is a (7 × 1) vector of 
constants, $0, $2 and $< are (7 × 7) matrices of coefficients and ,- is a (7 × 1) vector of residuals 




An important specification issue when we use VAR is stationarity. Therefore, we use 
growth rate of all variables, that are stationary, in our VARs. Also, all VAR models in this chapter 
include 4 lags which seem to be appropriate for quarterly data. Our results remain unchanged when 
we use AIC suggested lag length. Structural VAR is then defined as follow: 
O%!" = P + ∑ OR!"(R + S"
T
RU'                                                                                                      (1.2) 
Where !- = (/0-, /2- ,… /4-)6 is a vector of 7 variables at time 8 and S- represents the vector of 
structural innovations that are serially and mutually uncorrelated. If we left multiply the equation 
(1.2) by O9(0, we obtain the reduced form VAR with a similar format as equation (1.1). O9(0 has a 
recursive structure which is designed to decompose the reduced form errors ,- to exogenous 
structural shocks S-. 
," = O%
('S"                                                                                                                                   (1.3) 
To estimate a Structural VAR, we need to start with the reduced-form VAR and solve for structural 
parameters to find matrix O9. 
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Once we identify the structural VAR, we find impulse responses to each structural shock. 
To achieve this, we need to transform our structural VAR so our endogenous variables are defined 
as a sum of structural shocks: 
!" = V + ∑ WRO('S"(R
X
RU%                                                                                                             (1.4) 
Where V = $(Y)('$% and WZ represents (7 × 7) coefficient matrix of reduced form errors ," in 
the Vector Moving Average (VMA) format.4	 For each part of this chapter we first explain !- 
variables included and then show the recursive structure used to decompose the reduced form 
errors.  
Ramey (2016) explains characteristics of structural shocks as follows: “(1) they should be 
exogenous with respect to other current and lagged endogenous variables in the model; (2) they 
should be uncorrelated with other exogenous shocks and (3) they should represent either 
unanticipated movements in exogenous variables or news about future movements in exogenous 
variables.” Structural shocks estimated in this chapter are consistent with Ramey (2016)’s 
definition of structural shocks. 
1.3.1. Model 1: US GDP and Net Capital Inflow 
Earlier studies focused on net capital inflow to measure the effect of foreign capital on 
growth. Therefore, in our first model we study the effect of net foreign investments in the US on 
US output for comparison purposes.  
US GDP is US GDP growth and net capital inflow measures the growth of net foreign investment 
in the US. Net foreign investment in the US is defined as the gross US assets held by foreigners 
                                               
4 $(Y) is defined as $(Y) = (\4 − $0Y − $2Y2 −⋯− $<Y<) where Y, Y2,… , Y< are lag operators 
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less the gross foreign assets held by US residents. Our structural VAR follows the equation (1.2) 















We assume that US GDP growth does not respond to net capital inflow innovations within 
the same quarter. Capital inflow affects domestic output through two channels, exchange rate and 
interest rate. Based on exchange rate channel, higher capital inflow turns into higher demand for 
local currency which creates an upward pressure on price of local currency, US dollar in our case. 
Appreciation of US dollar makes US goods and services more expensive abroad and foreign goods 
and services cheaper in the United States. Therefore, US balance of payment deteriorates and US 
output decreases. 
The interest rate channel focuses on the impact of capital inflow on domestic interest rates. 
As foreign capital flows into the US the demand for US assets grows which creates a downward 
pressure on domestic interest rates. Lower domestic interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing in 
the US and promote investment and output. These effects will not be instant. Therefore, it is 
plausible to assume that the effects of capital inflow on US GDP will not occur within the same 
quarter. Net capital inflow innovations that have not been explained by GDP growth shocks will 
be included on net capital inflow shocks. The assumption that US output does not 
contemporaneously respond to capital flow innovations holds throughout this chapter.  
1.3.2. Model 2: US GDP, Gross US Assets Held by Foreigners and Gross Foreign Assets Held by 
US Residents. 
In this model, we study how US output responds to gross capital inflow shocks compared 
to gross capital outflow shocks. Gross capital inflow measures growth of total US assets held by 
foreigners and gross capital outflow measures growth of total foreign assets held by US residents. 
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Structural VAR follows equation (1.2) form and the decomposition of reduced form errors ,- 





















We allow capital inflow and outflow to respond to each other’s innovations 
contemporaneously. As a result, we require one more assumption for identification purposes. Thus, 
we assume	o2{ = o{2 so capital inflow and outflow affect each other contemporaneously and in 
equal magnitudes. This assumption seems to be in line with the co-movements observe in capital 
inflow and capital outflow series.  
1.3.3. Model 3: US GDP, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the US, US Portfolio Assets Held 
by Foreigners and Foreign Bank Lending. 
This model focuses on the components of US assets held by foreign investors and how they 
affect US GDP. FDI inflow is FDI growth, portfolio inflow measures the growth of portfolio 
investments held by foreigners and bank credit inflow is the growth of foreign bank lending. 









































We assume that US GDP growth does not respond to capital inflow innovations 
contemporaneously. Capital inflow innovations in this part include FDI innovations, portfolio 
innovations and bank credit innovations. We assume these innovations only affects US GDP 
growth with a lag. We also assume FDI inflow does not respond to portfolio innovations and bank 
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credit innovations contemporaneously. That is not far from reality because FDI is mainly seen as 
a long-term investment that does not fluctuate significantly in response to temporary changes. 
Thus, we can assume any portfolio or bank credit innovations only affect FDI with a lag. 
Portfolio investments and bank credits are fairly liquid and more responsive to shocks than 
FDI. Therefore, we assume that portfolio inflow responds to bank credit inflow innovations 
contemporaneously and vice versa. This assumption means o{Ü = oÜ{ which allows portfolio and 
bank credit inflows to respond to each other’s shocks contemporaneously and with equal 
magnitudes.  
1.3.4. Model 4: US GDP, US Equity Portfolio and US Debt Portfolio Held by Foreigners 
This model concentrates on how US GDP growth responds to shocks to equity and debt 
inflows, two components of portfolio inflow. Equity inflow measures growth rate of US equity and 
investment fund shares held by foreign investors, and debt inflow is growth rate of US debt held 
by foreign investors. Equity and investment fund shares held by foreigners include US corporate 
equity, money market fund shares and mutual fund shares. US debt held by foreigners consists of 
US corporate debt and US government debt. The structural VAR follows equation (1.2) where ,- 




















We assume that US GDP does not respond to equity inflow or debt inflow innovations 
within the same quarter. We also assume that debt inflow and equity inflow respond to each other’s 
innovations contemporaneously. This assumption is imposed by o2{ = o{2 so we are able to 
estimate the extra unknown parameter. This assumption is also in line with the fact that equity and 
bond markets operate on a daily basis, so investors have access to daily information such as interest 
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rates, yields and prices. Consequently, investors operating in these markets can observe 
unexpected changes and respond to them swiftly. 
1.3.5. Model 5: US GDP, US Government and Corporate Debt  
In this model, we examine the response of US output to shocks to US government debt 
inflow and US corporate debt inflow, two components of portfolio debt inflow. US government 
debt measures growth of US government debt held by foreigners and US corporate debt measures 
growth of US corporate debt held by foreigners. US government debt includes Treasury securities, 
US agency and government sponsored enterprise (GSE)-backed securities and municipal 
securities. US corporate debt contains US corporate bonds and open market paper. Structural VAR 





















US GDP does not respond to US debt innovations within the same quarter. We assume that 
US government debt held by foreigners does not respond to US corporate debt innovations within 
the same quarter. Therefore, US corporate debt innovations that cannot be explained by US output 
shocks or US government debt shocks reflect shocks to US corporate debt held by foreigners. 
1.4. Data 
There are three main sources that offer US capital flow data. IMF databases, International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics 
(BOP/IIP), are popular sources in capital flow literature. They are particularly useful for panel data 
studies as they contain both quarterly and annual data from numerous developed and developing 
countries. Apart from the main components of capital flow, BOP database also contains 
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subcategories that form each component. Compared to IMF databases, our data source goes one 
step further as it also includes data on components of portfolio equity and debt. Another benefit of 
our source is that it contains data on flows as well as levels for each category. 
First source is US International Transactions data from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The series in this dataset match with IMF BOP data, the only difference is that the extended 
details on US financial account starts from 1999 Q1 whereas IMF datasets goes back to 1970s. 
However, IMF highlights the fact that there is a break in comparability of data in 1999 Q1. That 
means the data reported after 1999 Q1 does not form a consistent series with the data reported 
prior to that date. That will only affect subcategories of capital flow’s main components such as 
equity and debt instruments. BEA has also reported quarterly data on US International Investment 
Position (IIP) since 2006. Those series are too short for our time series analysis. 
Second US-specific source is Treasury International Capital System (TIC). TIC data do not 
cover data on FDI flows but they cover most components of international financial flows. TIC 
monthly data are cross-border financial flows to and from US reported by broker/dealers of 
securities, banks and other market participants. TIC monthly and annual holdings data are reported 
by US custodians of securities, issuers of US securities in foreign countries and US investors in 
foreign securities that do not use US custodians5. 
Finally, the third source, and the one that we use for this chapter, is Financial Accounts of 
the United States- Z.1 tables- that are available from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System’s website. This source contains two sets of data series that are associated with US financial 
relations with the rest of the world. The first set, the one we use for this chapter, is presented in 
table L.133 Rest of the World and contains series on the levels of various US assets held by 
                                               
5 For more details on TIC data please visit: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic   
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foreigners and foreign assets held by US residents at the end of each quarter. The second set is 
presented in table F.133 Rest of the World and include series on the flows of assets and liabilities 
between US residents and foreign investors in each quarter. In financial accounts flow of assets 
means the exchange of assets, so this table is equivalent to transaction of assets and liabilities in 
each quarter. 
The difference between level and flow datasets are well explained in Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System’s website: 
“In the SNA2008, the change in the level from one period to the next is called the 
"economic flow," and can be decomposed into three broad elements: transactions, which measure 
the exchange of assets; revaluations, which measure changes in market value of untraded assets; 
and other changes in volume, which measure discontinuities or breaks in time series due to 
disaster losses or a change in source data or definition. In the "Financial Accounts," "flows" refer 
to the exchange of assets, corresponding to the SNA definition of transactions, that is, "flow tables" 
in the "Financial Accounts" are equivalent to "transaction tables" in the SNA terminology. In 
practice, other volume changes are relatively rare, and revaluations occur only for series carried 
at market value (such as corporate equities and mutual fund shares), so for many series the change 
in the level is equal to the flow.”6 
There are benefits to using this source. First of all, it contains quarterly data of more than 
five decades which reduce our concern over small sample size bias problem. Secondly, the 
financial accounts for the rest of the world has more details than any other datasets that we 
mentioned earlier. This characteristic allows us to investigate the role that each sub-category plays 
                                               




on US growth. This study is the first to study how shocks to components of foreign portfolio 
investment and its subcategories affect US GDP. It is important to note that financial accounts data 
does not categorize capital inflows and outflows in a conventional way. It shows financial assets 
and liabilities of rest of the word in relation to the US and it breaks down the components of each 
category. Unlike BEA data that explicitly identifies FDI, portfolio and bank credit, FRB’s database 
only identifies FDI explicitly, but it contains series that can be categorized either as portfolio 
investment or bank credit based on how they are calculated. For this chapter, we use this dataset 
and we calculate portfolio investments and bank credits using the details provided on each series. 
Appendix 1 contains a flow chart showing the relationship between capital inflow variables and 
their components. 
Apart from capital flow variables, we also collect US nominal GDP from BEA and US CPI 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). All variables are corrected for inflation and are 
in real terms. Since all variables have unit roots we use growth rates of them in our models that 
are stationary7. A brief description of the capital flow variables and descriptive statistics of all 
variables are presented in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2, respectively. 
1.5. Primary Empirical Results 
In this section, we present impulse responses associated with each structural VAR model 
introduced in section 1.3. We only report the accumulated responses that can be interpreted as the 
long-term effect on US GDP. We are interested in the first row of each panel as they present the 
effect of capital flow variables on US GDP. Since all our variables are in growth rate format, the 
unit of each vertical axis is percentage point. 
                                               
7 Unit root test results for all variables are reported in Appendix 2 
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Figure 1-5 captures impulse responses for the first model where we study the effect of net 
foreign investment in the US on US output. A positive one standard deviation shock to net capital 
inflow has a small positive effect of 0.1 percentage point on US GDP growth after eight quarters. 
This small positive effect is statistically insignificant. 
The impulses responses for the second SVAR are displayed in Figure 1-6. This model 
compares US GDP responses to gross capital inflow and gross capital outflow shocks. A one 
standard deviation shock to total US assets held by foreigners have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on US output. The long-run effect of this shock on US GDP eight quarters after 
it occurs is 0.5 percentage points. A positive shock to total foreign assets held by US residents has 
a small positive but statistically insignificant effect on US output growth after two years.  
Figure 1-7 displays responses of the third model and illustrates US GDP responses to 
shocks to FDI, portfolio and bank credit inflows. A positive shock to portfolio inflow has a positive 
and significant effect on US output. A one standard deviation increase in portfolio inflow raises 
US GDP by 0.7 percentage points after eight quarters. One standard deviation of portfolio inflow 
equals $570 billion in 2016 Q1. Therefore, the multiplier equals 0.23 for portfolio investment. A 
positive shock to bank credit inflow has a very small positive but insignificant effect on US output. 
Our results are different from Durham (2003)’s, where foreign portfolio investments are found to 
have no effect on growth. He also shows that foreign bank lending has a negative effect on growth. 
His sample include both developed and developing economies, which could be one possible reason 
for why our results are different. 
Finally, we find that a positive shock to FDI inflow has a negative but insignificant effect 
on US GDP growth in the long-run. The negative effect of FDI growth on US GDP growth is 
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puzzling. Most studies that focus on the effect of FDI on growth use FDI flows variables.8 Our 
dataset reports FDI levels based on current cost, the value of assets at the time of purchase. As a 
result of that, FDI series used in this study are different compared to FDI series reported by BEA 
or IMF, which are based on market value. We suspect that might be the reason for the unexpected 
negative sign of FDI effect on US output growth. Figure 1-8 portrays the difference between the 
two measurements of FDI, current cost and market value, over time and shows that the gap between 
these two measures have indeed widened over time. 
BEA International Investment Position (BEA IIP) data contains both current cost and 
market value measures of FDI. However, its quarterly series only go back to 2006 so we repeat 
the third SVAR using BEA IIP annual data instead. The annual VAR is based on one lag and 
impulse responses are calculated up to five years. Figure 1-9 shows impulse responses for the 
third model based on BEA IIP annual data. A positive shock to FDI growth has a positive effect 
of 0.8 percentage points on US output growth after two years. The positive effect of FDI inflow 
on US output is in line with what we expect from the literature. Thus, we conclude that the FDI 
negative sign we found earlier is mainly due to the use of FDI current cost data. 
Figure 1-10 portrays impulse responses of US GDP to equity and debt inflow shocks as 
described in the fourth SVAR. A positive shock to equity inflow has a positive and partially 
significant effect on US output growth. A one standard deviation shock to portfolio equity inflow 
increases US output by 0.4 percentage points after eight quarters. One standard deviation of equity 
inflow equals $514 billion in 2016 Q1. Thus, the multiplier for equity investment is 0.14. Our 
estimate is in line with Blanchard et al. (2015)’s estimations. They show that one percent increase 
                                               
8 See Iwasaki and Tokunaga (2014)’s for further references on this issue. 
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of portfolio equity flows as percentage of GDP increases GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points. 
Moreover, we find that a positive shock to debt inflow have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on US output. A one standard deviation improvement in portfolio debt inflow increases US 
GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points after two years. One standard deviation of debt inflow is 
$276 billion in 2016 Q1. Therefore, the multiplier equals 0.33 for debt inflow. 
Figure 1-11 illustrates impulse responses for the fifth model, impulse responses of US 
output to shocks to US government debt and US corporate debt. A positive shock to US corporate 
debt has a positive and significant effect on US GDP growth. Within two years, US GDP increases 
by 0.7 percentage points in response to a one standard deviation shock to US corporate debt inflow. 
One standard deviation of US corporate debt inflow equals $144 billion in 2016 Q1. Therefore, 
the multiplier for US corporate debt inflow is 0.89. A positive shock to US government debt inflow 
has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on US GDP growth. One standard deviation of 
US government debt inflow equals $218 billion in 2016 Q1. Thus, the multiplier for US 
government debt inflow is 0.25. US corporate debt inflow has the highest multiplier among 
subcategories of portfolio investment. 
Our analysis shows that shocks to foreign portfolio investments have positive and 
significant impact on US GDP growth in the long-run. 
1.6. Results from Local Projection Method 
Standard VAR impulse responses can be sensitive to lag-order choice. Kilian (2001) 
explains that the effects of overfitting and underfitting of a VAR model on impulse responses are 
asymmetric. He compares the impulse responses point estimates and confidence intervals resulted 
from different information criteria and concludes that VAR models with lag-order based on 
parsimonious criteria such as SIC and HQC perform well at short horizons but perform poorly at 
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longer time horizons. He also shows that models with lag-order based on more balanced criteria 
such as AIC perform well at both short and long horizons. 
In this section, we use local projection method to re-estimate impulse responses for each 
model described in the previous section. Jordà (2005) introduces local projection impulse response 
function (LPIRF) that is robust to misspecifications. In this method, impulse responses are 
calculated based on a series of regressions that have lead orders of endogenous variable on their 
left-hand side. This method has helped researchers calculate impulse responses that are more 
robust to lag misspecifications compared to standard VAR impulse responses.  
Jordà (2005) uses the following notation to describe how å-çb is projected onto the linear 
space of lag orders of å-: 
å"çé = Pé + è'
éç'å"(' + è)
éç'å"() +⋯+ è+éç'å"(+ + ê"çéé                                                    (1.5) 
ë = 0, 1, 2,… , ℎ − 1 
Where å-çr is the projection of å at horizon 8 + ë, Pr is an 7 × 1 vector of constants and îZrç0 
represents matrices of coefficients for each lag ï and horizon ë + 1. There will be one regression 
for each value of ë and local projections include ℎ regressions computed using equation (1.5). It 
is important to note that when ë = 0 equation (1.5) is the same as a standard VAR.9 LPIRF can 
then be estimated by: 
\ñó(", é, òR) = èô'
éòR                                              é = %, ', ),… , ö − '                                        (1.6) 
Where òZ represents the shocks and î09 = \ for ë = 0.  
                                               
9 Ronayne (2011) points out that Jordà (2005) original notation ë = 0, 1, 2,… , ℎ will lead to ℎ + 1 regressions 





Kilian and Kim (2009) compare bias and variance of impulse responses from standard 
VAR and local projection models. They argue that local projection estimators have higher bias and 
variance in small samples and as the sample size grows the bias of local projection estimators 
shrinks but their asymptotic intervals become significantly wider than standard VAR ones. They 
reject that local projection confidence intervals are more accurate than standard VAR intervals. 
In defense of local projection methods, Ronayne (2011) compares standard VAR impulse 
responses with local projection impulse responses and finds that they diverge after horizons higher 
than the lag length used in associated VARs. He shows that the bias of standard VAR impulse 
responses increases in longer horizons and suggests including local projection impulse responses 
especially when one studies long-run effects. Therefore, in this section, we estimate local 
projection responses for the models we explained in section 1.3 and compare the standard VAR 
impulse responses with local projection ones for the variables of interest. 
Local projection and standard VAR impulse responses of US GDP to a positive shock to 
portfolio inflows are shown in Figure 1-12. Panel A shows local projection and standard VAR 
impulse responses of US GDP to a positive shock to portfolio inflow and Panel B compares the 
accumulated impulse responses obtained from the two methods. LPIRF shows that a one standard 
deviation shock to portfolio inflow increases US GDP by 0.5 and 0.9 percentage points after 8 and 
14 quarters, respectively. LPIRF is close to our standard VAR impulse responses where a positive 
shock to portfolio inflow increases US output by 0.7 percentage points after two years. 
Figure 1-13 shows local projection and standard VAR impulse responses of US GDP to 
shocks to equity and debt inflows, components of portfolio inflow. Panel A and Panel B show 
impulse responses and accumulated impulse responses of US GDP to equity and debt inflow 
shocks, respectively. LPIRF displays that a one standard deviation increase in portfolio equity 
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inflow increases US GDP by 0.3 and 0.6 percentage points after 8 and 14 quarters, respectively. 
In response to a positive shock to portfolio debt inflow, US output goes up by 0.7 percentage points 
after 14 quarters. LPIRF and standard VAR impulse responses lead to similar results. 
Finally, we compare local projection and standard VAR impulse responses to shocks to 
components of portfolio debt on US GDP in Figure 1-14. Panel A and Panel B exhibit impulse 
responses and accumulated impulse responses of US GDP to US government and corporate debt 
inflow shocks, respectively. A one standard deviation rise in US corporate debt inflow increases 
US GDP growth by 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points after two and five years, respectively. A positive 
shock to US government debt inflow elevates US output by 0.3 percentage points after two years. 
However, the effect turns negative after five years. Overall, local projection impulse responses 
support our claim that portfolio inflow shocks have positive and significant effects on the US 
economy. 
1.7. Results from Factor Augmented VAR Models 
One of the issues of the VAR approach is that every additional variable to the model 
increases the number of parameters that need to be estimated exponentially. Therefore, we have 
followed the conventional method by considering a core VAR and changing the variables to study 
their effects. Consequently, there might be concerns that our estimates are subjected to omitted 
variable bias. For example, if we included US interest rates, representing US monetary policy, 
would the effect of foreign investment on US GDP become negligible. In this section, we use two 
methods to study whether including the effects of US monetary policy influence our results. First, 
we use Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) method, similar to the framework used by Bernanke et 
al. (2005), to include the effects of US monetary policy. We assume that our core VAR variables 
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are observable, so we can compare the impulse responses of our standard VAR and FAVAR 
models. 
In all our FAVAR models, we assume US GDP is an observable, slow-moving factor, 
capital inflow variables are observable fast-moving factors and there is one unobservable fast-
moving factor representing US monetary policy that is estimated from five US interest rate series. 
Observable factors are standardized versions of the associated observable variables and the 
unobservable factor is estimated using principal component method as explained by Bernanke et 
al. (2005). 
Our FAVAR impulse responses are comparable to standard VAR impulse responses 
obtained from models (3) through (5). However, it is important to note that the vertical axes in our 
FAVAR impulse responses represent unit of standard deviation as all included factors are 
standardized. We only report impulse responses of US GDP to shocks to our variables of interest, 
portfolio inflow and its components. Therefore, to compare the FAVAR results with standard VAR 
ones we need to multiply the FAVAR responses by standard deviation of US GDP, 0.8 percentage 
points.  
In the first FAVAR, we study the effect of portfolio inflow shocks on US GDP. The 
included factors are as follows: 
!- = (õú	ùûü-, †û°	ï7¢£§•-, ¶§ß8¢§£ï§	ï7¢£§•-, ®o7©	™ß`´ï8	ï7¢£§•-,¨§7`8oß/	¶§£ï™/-)6   
We assume that õú	ùûü-, †û°	ï7¢£§•-, ¶§ß8¢§£ï§	ï7¢£§•-, ®o7©	™ß`´ï8	ï7¢£§•- are 
observable factors and ¨§7`8oß/	¶§£ï™/- is unobservable factor estimated using five US interest 
rate series. The interest rates are 3-Month Treasury Bill, 6-Month Treasury Bill, 1-Year Treasury 
Constant Maturity Rate, 2-Year Constant Maturity Rate, and 5-Year Constant Maturity Rate. 
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To identify the shocks, we use recursive ordering and we assume that US GDP only 
responds to capital inflow and monetary policy innovations with a lag. We also assume that FDI 
does not respond to portfolio and bank credit inflow innovations within the same quarter. Similar 
to our standard VAR, portfolio and bank credit inflow respond to each other’s innovations 
contemporaneously and in equal magnitudes. Following Bernanke et al. (2005) we order the 
monetary policy factor last so interest rate innovations that have not been captured by US GDP 
shocks, FDI shocks, portfolio inflow shocks and bank credit inflow shocks are defined as US 
monetary policy shocks.  
Figure 1-15 shows that a positive shock to portfolio inflow has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on US GDP. A one standard deviation shock to portfolio inflow increases US 
output by 0.6 percentage points after two years, very close to 0.7 percentage points we found from 
our standard structural VAR model. 
The second FAVAR studies the effect of shocks to components of portfolio inflow, equity 
and debt, on US output. The following factors are included: 
!- = (õú	ùûü-, `≠Æï8/	ï7¢£§•-, ´`®8	ï7¢£§•-,¨§7`8oß/	¶§£ï™/-)6    
We assume that US GDP only responds to equity, debt and monetary policy innovations 
with a lag. Equity and debt inflow respond to each other’s innovations contemporaneously and in 
equal magnitudes. Interest rate innovations that have not been captured by US GDP, equity and 
debt shocks are defined by US monetary policy shocks.  
Figure 1-16 illustrates the effect of equity and debt inflow shocks on US output. A positive 
one standard deviation shock to equity and debt inflow increase US GDP by equal magnitudes of 
0.4 percentage points after two years. 
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The final FAVAR displays the effect of US government debt and corporate debt inflow 
shocks on US GDP and contains the following factors: 
!- =
(õú	ùûü-,õú	Ø§∞`ß7¨`78	´`®8	ï7¢£§•-, õú	™§ß¶§ßo8`	´`®8	ï7¢£§•-,¨§7`8oß/	¶§£ï™/-)
6    
We assume that US output does not respond to US government, corporate debt inflow and 
monetary policy innovations contemporaneously. Moreover, US government debt inflow does not 
respond to US corporate debt inflow and monetary policy innovations within the same quarter. We 
also assume US corporate debt inflow innovations only respond to US monetary policy shocks 
with a lag. Interest rate innovations that cannot be explained by US GDP shocks, US government 
and corporate debt inflow shocks are captured by US monetary policy shocks. 
Figure 1-17 shows a positive shock to US corporate debt inflow has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on US output. A one standard deviation shock to US corporate debt 
increases US GDP by 0.6 percentage points after eight quarters. A positive shock to US 
government debt inflow has a small positive but statistically insignificant long-term effect on US 
output. 
In the second method, we include the Wu-Xia shadow federal funds rate in our standard 
VAR models to study the effects of US monetary policy on our estimates. Effective Federal Funds 
rate remained below 25 basis points for almost seven years, so we include Wu-Xia shadow federal 
funds rate instead of Effective Federal Funds Rate to capture Federal Reserve unconventional 
monetary policy during and after the financial crisis. This data adds valuable information that 
might not be represented fully by Effective Federal Funds rate alone. Wu and Xia (2016) estimated 
shadow federal funds rate and allowed it to become negative.  
Black (1995) explained that the short-term interest rate cannot be negative because we have 
currency with zero interest rate as an option. If currency was not an option, then interest rate could 
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become negative and shadow interest rate captures that. Wu and Xia (2016)’s shadow federal funds 
rate is identical to Effective Federal Funds rate when the shadow fed funds rate is at least 25 basis 
points. However, they deviate when the rate ranges between 0 and 25 basis points. The results are 
similar to standard VAR impulse responses.10  
Our conclusion that portfolio inflow shocks have a positive and significant impact on US 
economy holds even when we account for US monetary policy.  
1.8. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the effect of portfolio inflow and its components on 
the US economy. While there is a wide range of papers covering multiple aspects of capital flows 
to and from emerging economies, there are not many papers that study the effects of foreign 
investments on output in advanced economies. This chapter addresses that issue by focusing on 
the United States. We use structural VAR methods because it allows us to incorporate feedback 
effects in our models. We use rest of the world section of US financial accounts, a dataset from 
1980 Q1 to 2016 Q1, which is available from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s 
website. This disaggregated database allows us to study the impact of shocks to components of 
portfolio inflow on US GDP.  
Our results show that a one standard deviation shock to foreign portfolio investment 
increases US GDP growth by 0.7 percentage points after two years. We also find that a positive 
shock to US corporate debt inflow has a positive and significant effect on US GDP growth in the 
long run. A one standard deviation shock to US corporate debt inflow improves US output growth 
by 0.7 percentage points within two years. Our results suggest that while the effect of equity inflow 
                                               
10 The results are not reported in the chapter, but they are available upon request. 
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on the US economy is similar to what has been reported for emerging economies, the effect of debt 
inflow on US GDP is significantly greater than what has been found for developing economies. 
For example, Blanchard et al. (2015) estimated that one percent increases of portfolio equity inflow 
and debt inflow increase emerging economies GDP growth by 0.5 and 0.03 percentage points, 
respectively. 
Our results are robust to using local projection methods to estimate impulse responses. 
Local projection impulse responses are robust to misspecification and provide reliable results for 
longer horizons. Furthermore, the effect of portfolio inflow shocks on US GDP remains positive 
and significant even after we control for the effects of US monetary policy. Our findings can be 
particularly beneficial to policy makers in emerging countries and provide a further motive for 
them to encourage the development of their capital markets. By studying the impact of capital 
inflows on the US economy, emerging economies can project the effect of foreign investment on 
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Table 1-1-Description of capital inflow variables 
Capital flow Variables Brief description 
net capital inflow  The difference between total US assets held by foreigners and total foreign assets held by US residents 
Gross capital inflow Total US assets held by foreigners which include FDI in the US, portfolio and bank credit inflows 
Gross capital outflow Total foreign assets held by US residents which include FDI abroad, portfolio and bank credit outflows 
FDI inflow (current cost) US equity and debt held by foreigners when they own and control 10 percent or more of nonresident entity’s voting securities. It is calculated based on the cost of FDI assets at the time of their purchase 
FDI inflow (market value) US equity and debt held by foreigners when they own and control 10 percent or more of nonresident entity’s voting securities. It is calculated based on the market value of FDI assets at that point in time 
Portfolio inflow US equity and debt held by foreigners that are not included in FDI 
Bank credit inflow  Financial assets held by foreigners that are not included in FDI and portfolio investments 
Portfolio equity inflow US corporate equity, mutual fund shares and money market shares held by foreigners  
Portfolio debt inflow  US corporate debts and US government debts held by foreigners  
US corporate debt inflow  US corporate bonds and open market paper also known as commercial paper held by foreigners 





Table 1-2-Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Source Sample # Obs. 
Real GDP growth 0.52 2.04 -3.20 0.79 BEA1 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real GDP growth 2.13 6.22 -4.27 2.13 BEA1 1976-20166 40 
Real net capital inflow growth 9.12 574.49 -576.61 77.60 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real total capital inflow growth 1.99 13.43 -4.67 2.49 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real total capital outflow growth 1.55 13.37 -11.61 3.50 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real FDI inflow growth (current cost) 1.78 18.88 -5.02 2.75 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real FDI inflow growth (market value) 9.21 54.34 -32.82 14.54 BEA3 1976-20166 40 
Real portfolio inflow growth 2.26 11.65 -9.25 3.39 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real portfolio inflow growth 8.23 24.43 -14.50 8.53 BEA3 1976-20166 40 
Real bank credit inflow growth 1.35 33.26 -23.68 7.04 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real bank credit inflow growth 6.40 23.63 -8.21 7.83 BEA3 1976-20166 40 
Real portfolio equity inflow growth 2.46 20.84 -32.59 8.37 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real portfolio debt inflow growth 2.17 10.88 -6.33 2.58 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real US corporate debt inflow growth 2.61 21.68 -13.75 4.30 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Real US government debt inflow growth 2.04 12.98 -7.57 2.97 FRB2 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 4.53 15.05 0.01 3.60 FRED4 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
6-Month Treasury Bill Rate 4.63 15.06 0.05 3.58 FRED4 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 5.03 16.32 0.10 3.84 FRED4 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 5.38 16.03 0.26 3.82 FRED4 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
5- Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 5.94 15.43 0.67 3.54 FRED4 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
Wu-Xia shadow federal funds rate 4.92 18.37 -2.92 4.56 FRBA5 1980 Q1-2016Q1 145 
1 National Data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2 Financial Accounts of the United States from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
3 International Investment Position from US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
4 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
5 Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 




Figure 1-1-US international investments 
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Figure 1-2-Main components of total foreign investment in the US 
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Figure 1-3-Change in composition of foreign investment in the US  
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Figure 1-4-Debt and equity as share of portfolio investment 
 




























































































































debt share equity share
41 
 
Figure 1-5-Impulse responses for US GDP and net foreign investments 
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Figure 1-6-Impulse responses for US GDP, capital inflow and capital outflow 
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Figure 1-7-Impulse responses for US GDP, FDI, portfolio inflow and bank credits  
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Figure 1-8-FDI current cost and market value 
 
Source: Financial Accounts of the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
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Figure 1-9-Impulse responses for US GDP, FDI, portfolio inflow and bank credits 
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Figure 1-10-Impulse responses for US GDP, equity and debt inflow 
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Figure 1-11-Impulse responses for US GDP, government debt and corporate debt 
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Figure 1-12-LP impulse responses for US GDP and portfolio inflow 




Note: The blue solid line is the impulse responses calculated by local projections method, red dash lines are 
two standard error bands for coefficients of local projections responses and the green line with circles is the 
impulse response from the standard VAR model. 
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Figure 1-13-LP impulse responses for US GDP, equity and debt inflow 




Note: The blue solid lines are the impulse responses calculated by local projections method, red dash lines 
are two standard error bands for coefficients of local projections responses and the green lines with circles 
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Figure 1-14-LP impulse responses for US GDP, government and corporate debt 




Note: The blue solid lines are the impulse responses calculated by local projections method, red dash lines 
are two standard error bands for coefficients of local projections responses and the green lines with circles 
are the impulse response from standard VAR models. 
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Figure 1-15-FAVAR impulse responses for US GDP and portfolio inflow 
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Figure 1-16-FAVAR impulse responses for US GDP, equity inflow and debt inflow 
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Figure 1-17-FAVAR impulse responses for US GDP, government and corporate debt 
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Chapter 2:  Forecasting US GDP Growth, Does 
Foreign Investment Matter? 
2.1. Introduction 
Total foreign investment in the US reached $24.5 trillion by the end of the first quarter of 
2017.11 Despite the volume of foreign capital in the US, there are limited studies that look at the 
effect of capital inflow on US economy.12 Moreover, capital flow variables have not been 
considered in the forecasting of US GDP. This chapter aims to close that gap by studying whether 
the inclusion of capital flow variables can improve US GDP forecasts.  
We apply the three-pass regression filter (3PRF) method introduced by Kelly and Pruitt 
(2015) to forecast US GDP using capital inflow and outflow as well as trade variables. We use the 
disaggregated capital flow series from 1991 Q4 to 2017 Q1 reported in the United States financial 
accounts. We also consider a number of benchmark models and use the mean square forecast error 
(MSFE) metric to compare in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts of 3PRF models with the 
benchmark ones. We use autoregressive (AR) and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models 
as our benchmarks. These models are commonly used in the literature as benchmarks since they 
are known to perform well and are hard to beat (Banerjee and Marcellino (2006), Rapach and 
Strauss (2008), Castle et al. (2013) and Ravazzolo and Rothman (2013)). 
                                               
11 That is the lower bound of total foreign investment where foreign direct investment is valued on current-cost 
basis. If foreign direct investment is measured at market-value, total US liabilities for the same period goes up 
to almost $33 trillion according to US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
12 See Warnock and Warnock (2009) for the impact of international capital inflow on US long-term interest 
rates. They show that US long-term interest rates would have been 80 basis points higher if the international 
capital inflow was zero for one year. 
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Our results show that incorporating capital flow variables by employing 3PRF method 
produces significantly more accurate US GDP forecasts than AR models. Inclusion of capital flow 
variables can improve in-sample MSFE of autoregressive forecasts by at least 18 percent. In 
comparison to ARDL models, in-sample 3PRF forecasts perform at least as well as the benchmark 
models in shorter horizons and better in longer horizons. Inclusion of capital flow and trade 
information by applying 3PRF can improve MSFE of ARDL models by at least 6 percent in longer 
horizons. 3PRF out-of-sample forecasts with capital inflow and outflow variables perform 
significantly better than AR benchmarks in shorter horizons (ℎ = 1, 2, 4) but in longer horizons 
(ℎ = 8) they only marginally outperform AR models. Our results show that 3PRF forecasts 
outperform ARDL models in the overwhelming majority of cases, although their margins are slim 
when ARDL models are well-specified. 
The first contribution of this chapter is the inclusion of capital flow variables in forecasting 
US GDP growth. In the forecasting of macroeconomic variables with a large number of predictors, 
external information is limited to the inclusion of trade series such as exports and imports (e.g. 
Stock and Watson, 2012), and the importance of foreign investments has been overlooked. The 
second contribution is estimating US GDP forecasts using 3PRF and comparing them with AR 
and ARDL models. We show that in-sample and out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts, with capital flow 
variables, outperform pure autoregressive models for all forecasting horizons. Out-of-sample 
forecasts of 3PRF models using capital flow and trade variables outperform ARDL models. The 
improvements are small, however, when ARDL models are well-specified. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents brief empirical 
background on the effect of capital flow on economic growth. In section 2.3, we explain the 3PRF 
method and our benchmark models. The description of our data source is presented in section 2.4 
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Section 2.5 compares 3PRF in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts with the benchmark models, 
and section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2. Empirical Background on Capital Flow and Growth 
In this section, we look at studies on the effect of capital flow on economic growth. There 
is a division between the effect of capital inflow on growth suggested by theory and what policy 
makers in emerging economies believe (Blanchard et al., 2016). Theory suggests that an increase 
of capital inflow into a country with flexible exchange rate policy puts upward pressure on 
domestic currency. Therefore, domestic currency appreciates, and the country’s current account 
deteriorates, resulting in lower GDP if the money supply remains unchanged. In practice, an 
ongoing flow of foreign capital into a country also puts downward pressure on domestic interest 
rates promoting investment and increasing output. Blanchard et al. (2015) show that increases in 
non-bond flows and bond-flows have positive and negative impact on output, respectively.  
Warnock and Warnock (2009) study the effect of international capital inflow on US long-
term interest rates by looking at the effect of foreign-purchased US government bonds on 10-year 
Treasury yields. They show that if there was no foreign purchase of US government bonds for one 
year, long-term rates would have been 80 basis points higher. They also find similar effects on US 
mortgage rates and other long-term interest rates. Their study is conducted before the recent 
financial crisis, so it does not include post-financial crisis period. Our sample, however, covers 
pre- and post- financial crisis.  
Aizenman et.al (2013) study the effects of international capital flows on economic growth 
of 100 countries between 1990 and 2010. They find a significant and stable relationship between 
FDI and growth. However, the relationships between portfolio flows and growth were less stable. 
They show one standard deviation increases in FDI inflow and outflow increase growth rate of 
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GDP per capita by 1.8 and 12.06 percentage points, respectively. They find that a one standard 
deviation increase of FDI inflow, equity investment and short-term debt during pre-crisis period 
increase GDP per capita growth by 0.94, 0.39 and zero percentage points, respectively. 
Durham (2003) examines the effect of foreign portfolio investment and bank lending on 
economic growth of 88 countries from 1977 to 2000. His estimations show that portfolio 
investments and foreign bank lending have no effect and negative impact on growth, respectively. 
However, he mentions that his results might be affected by simultaneity bias given the use of 
simultaneous equations. The author shows that one percentage point increases in the ratio of 
portfolio investments to GDP and foreign bank lending as percentage of GDP reduce average 
growth rates by 1.4 and 0.15 percentage points, respectively. 
2.3. Forecasting Methods 
In this section, we briefly explain dimension reduction techniques used in macroeconomic 
forecasting literature, we then describe 3PRF forecasting method in section 2.3.1 and our 
benchmark forecasts in section 2.3.2.  
Stock and Watson (2002) were the first to study large number of predictors in forecasting 
macroeconomic variables. They use principal component analysis to estimate unobserved latent 
factors which capture the covariability of the predictors and use them for forecasting 
macroeconomic series. Principal component method only looks at the predictors, so the extracted 
factors are the best fit for the predictors and not necessarily the target series. Boivin and Ng (2006) 
address the issue with using large number of predictors. They show that in an unscreened large 
dataset, the factors with high forecasting power can be dominated by other factors. Their 
forecasting exercise shows that factors extracted from small-sized, pre-screened series of 40 lead 
to better results compared to factors from large, unscreened series. 
58 
 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) is an alternative dimension reduction technique introduced by 
Wold (1982). In PLS latent factors are extracted from the correlation or covariance matrix that 
includes both target variable and predictors. It took decades for the method to gain momentum in 
macroeconomic forecasting, but recently it has been used as an alternative dimension reduction 
technique in forecasting with large dataset (e.g. Fuentes et al. (2015), Groen and Kapetanios (2016) 
and Carrasco and Rossi (2016)). 
2.3.1. Three-Pass Regression Filter Forecasts 
In this section, we explain 3PRF method introduced by Kelly and Pruitt (2015). They show 
that 3PRF can be reduced to PLS when: in the first pass the target variable is used as a proxy, 
predictors are demeaned and standardized and no constant is used in the first two passes. They use 
the 3PRF method to forecast various macroeconomic variables and show that 3PRF performs best 
for eight out of thirteen variables. In this chapter, we apply Kelly and Pruitt (2015)’s 3PRF method 
to estimate both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts of US GDP using capital inflow, outflow 
and trade variables. For simplicity, we explain the method for the case where predictors only 
include capital inflow variables. The same steps can be used even when predictors include 
additional series such as capital outflow and trade variables. 3PRF estimates can be obtained from 
a set of three OLS regressions: 
First pass is the time series regression where we regress time series of capital inflow 
predictors on the matrix of proxies one by one: 
)*,+ = ,-,* + /0,* + 1*+   for * = 2, . . . , 4.	                                                                                  (2.1) 
Where 67,8 is the time series of capital inflow variable 9, / is a 1 × ; vector of our single proxy, 
,7 is a 1 × < vector of slope coefficients and < is the number of capital inflow predictors. We 
save the slope estimate ,=7.  
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In the second pass, we regress cross section of capital inflow predictors on slope estimates 
obtained from the first pass: 
)*,+ = ,-,+ + ϕ=0?+ + @*+ for + = 2, . . . , A.	                                                                                   (2.2) 
?8 is a 1 × ; vector of slope coefficients and ; is number of observations in each time series. We 
save the slope estimate ?=8. 
Finally, in the third pass, we regress one-period ahead of US GDP, our target variable, on 
predictive factors obtained from the second pass: 
B+C2 = D- + ?=0D + E+C2                                                                                                             (2.3) 
Equation (9) provide us with forecasted US GDP, FG8CH.  
We used the following auto-proxy algorithm, introduced by Kelly and Pruitt (2015), to 
select a single proxy that we use in the first pass: 
 “… 
1. Initialize IJ = B.     For K = 1, . . . , L: 
2. Define the kth automatic proxy to be NOPH. Stop if K = L; otherwise proceed. 
3. Compute the 3PRF for target B using cross section R using statistical proxies 1 through K. 
Denote the resulting forecast FGO . 
4. Calculate NO = F − FGO , advance K, and go to step 1.” 
Where B is our target variable, US GDP, L is the number of proxies, that is equal to one, and R is 
the matrix of capital inflow variables.  
Once we estimate FG8CH we can calculate associated forecasts errors as follows: 
T+C2 = B+C2 − BU+C2                                                                                                                     (2.4) 
For ℎ-step ahead forecasts, one can just replace F8CH with F8CV as explained by Kelly and Pruitt 
(2015). However, we define F8CV = (
H
V
)∑ F8CYVYZH  as the forecast of US GDP over the next ℎ 
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quarters so it is consistent with our benchmark models. Therefore, forecast errors for ℎ step ahead 
forecasts are calculated as follows: 
T+C[ = B+C[ − BU+C[                                                                                                                    (2.5) 
We then use these forecast errors to calculate mean square forecast error (MSFE) of 3PRF 
forecasts. 
2.3.2. Benchmark Forecasts 
In this section, we explain our benchmark forecasts that are used to evaluate 3PRF 
forecasts. We use ten benchmark forecasts, two autoregressive models (AR (1) and AR (4)), two 
autoregressive distributed lag models with only gross capital inflow (ARDL (1,1) inflow, ARDL 
(4,4) inflow), two ARDL models with only net exports (ARDL (1,1) net trade, ARDL (4,4) net 
trade), two ARDL with both gross capital inflow and outflow variables (ARDL (1,1,1) flows, 
ARDL (4,4,4) flows) and two ARDL with exports and imports variables (ARDL (1,1,1) trade and 
ARDL (4,4,4) trade). The ℎ step ahead forecast of the autoregressive models are estimated as 
follows: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2
^Z- + @+C[
[                                                                                                   (2.6) 
Where F8CVV = (
H
V
)∑ F8CYVYZH  is the approximate of US GDP over the next ℎ quarters and `His the 
number of lags in each AR model (e.g. `H = 1 for AR (1) and `H = 4 for AR (4)). Autoregressive 
benchmarks especially AR (4) is commonly used in forecasting literature to evaluate the predictive 
power of more complex methods (e.g. Fuentes et al., 2015). 
We also consider ARDL models where in addition to lags of US GDP, lags of aggregate 
capital flow and trade variables are also included in the models. These benchmarks are used to 
compare 3PRF forecasts with forecasts obtained from aggregate variables such as gross capital 
flows and trade. We use four different types of ARDL models: The first type has total capital 
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inflow (e.g. ARDL (1,1) inflow), the second type contains net exports (e.g. ARDL (1,1) net trade), 
the third type includes both total capital inflow and outflow (e.g. ARDL (1,1,1) flows) and the 
fourth type has both exports and imports (e.g. ARDL (1,1,1) trade). For the first type, we estimate 
ℎ-step ahead forecasts as follows: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2P2
^Z- ∑ a^, )*bcdef,+P^
_gP2
^Z- + @+C[
[                                                                (2.7) 
Where 67hijkl is total capital inflow, `H is the lag length of target variable and  `m is the lag length 
of total capital inflow variable. The second type is very similar to the first type, the only difference 
is that we use net exports instead of total capital inflow: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2P2
^Z- ∑ a^, )bn+	n)_eI+o,+P^
_gP2
^Z- + @+C[
[                                                          (2.8) 
The third and fourth types have two sets of predictors. The third type contains capital inflow and 
capital outflow: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2P2
^Z- ∑ a^, )*bcdef,+P^
_gP2
^Z- + ∑ p^, )eT+cdef,+P^
_qP2
^Z- + @+C[
[                         (2.9) 
Where 6kr8ijkl is total capital outflow and  `s is lag length of total capital outflow. The fourth 
type is similar to the third type, but it includes exports and imports instead of capital inflow and 
outflow: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2P2
^Z- ∑ a^, )n)_eI+o,+P^
_gP2
^Z- + ∑ p^, )*t_eI+o,+P^
_qP2
^Z- + @+C[
[                      (2.10) 
We consider forecast horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 8 quarters. In-sample forecasts are calculated 
using the entire sample from 1991 Q4 until 2017 Q1. The recursive out-of-sample forecasts are 
estimated by dividing the sample in half, where the first half is used to estimate the coefficients 
and form the initial forecast and the second half is used to evaluate the forecasts.  
For each benchmark model, forecast errors are calculated as follows: 
T+C[ = B+C[[ − BU+C[[                                                                                                                   (2.11) 
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The benchmark forecast errors are then used to calculate uvwxyzh{V|}~O . Finally, we compare 




                                                                                                      (2.12) 
uvwx~}87k  smaller than one indicates that 3PRF forecast performs better than the benchmark 
model.  
2.4. Data 
The data source of this chapter is Financial Accounts of the United States- Z.1 tables- that 
are available from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s website. This source 
contains two sets of data series that are associated with US financial relations with the rest of the 
world. The first set, the one we use, is presented in table L.133 Rest of the World and contains 
series on the levels of various US assets held by foreigners and foreign assets held by US residents 
at the end of each quarter. Second set is presented in table F.133 Rest of the World and include 
series on the flows of assets and liabilities between US residents and foreign investors in each 
quarter. In financial accounts flow of assets means the exchange of assets so this table is equivalent 
to transaction of assets and liabilities in each quarter. 
The benefit of this source is that it contains disaggregated data on the components of capital 
inflow and outflow. Our sample covers the period from 1991 Q4 until 2017 Q1. There are two 
reasons why we choose to start our sample from 1991. First, prior to 1991 there are multiple series 
containing zero and after 1991 there is only one series including zero. Second, we preferred our 
forecast evaluation period to include pre- and post-financial crisis. If we started our sample from 
2001, where all series are non-zero, our forecasting evaluation period would start in mid 2009, 
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after the financial crisis. So, to avoid that, we opt for 1991 Q4. Appendix 1 and Appendix 3 
contain flow charts of capital inflow and capital outflow variables, respectively.13  
Apart from capital flow variables we also collect US real GDP (billions of chained 2009 
dollars) and US GDP deflator (2009=100) from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) as well 
as US net exports, exports and imports from US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All 
variables are corrected for inflation. Also, all variables have a unit root, so we use annualized 
growth rates to ensure stationary. Descriptions of capital inflow and capital outflow variables are 
presented in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, respectively. And descriptive statistics of all variables are 
displayed in Table 2-3. 
2.5. Primary Results 
In this section, we present MSFE ratios associated with models introduced in Section 2.2. 
Table 2-4 shows the performance of 3PRF in-sample forecasts compared to benchmark forecasts. 
The first column captures MSFE ratios where the numerator is MSFE of 3PRF forecasts using 
only capital inflow. Note that associated ARDL benchmarks include two types of models: one that 
includes lags of only total capital inflow and another one that contains lags of net exports. Our 
results show that 3PRF forecasts with only capital inflow variables perform significantly better 
than autoregressive models, AR (1) and AR (4), regardless of forecast horizons. 3PRF forecasts 
perform better than simple autoregressive forecasts by at least 18 percent. In comparison to ARDL 
models, 3PRF forecasts perform at least as good in short forecasting horizons and significantly 
better in longer horizons. 
                                               
13 We only used the most disaggregated series of each category. 
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The second column illustrates MSFE ratios where the numerator is MSFE of 3PRF 
forecasts using both capital inflow and capital outflow variables and the denominator is the MSFE 
of associated benchmark models. There are three types of benchmark models in this column. The 
first type is the autoregressive models. The second type is ARDL models including both capital 
inflow and outflow variables. And the third type is ARDL models containing exports and imports. 
3PRF in-sample forecasts with capital inflow and outflow variables outperform autoregressive 
benchmark forecasts by at least 21 percent. In short-horizons, 3PRF forecasts, with capital inflow 
and outflow, perform at least as well as ARDL benchmarks with capital inflow and outflow. In 
longer horizons, however, 3PRF forecasts perform notably better. 3PRF forecasts perform at least 
as well as ARDL models with exports and imports. 
The third column displays MSFE ratios where the numerator is MSFE of 3PRF forecasts 
using capital inflow, capital outflow, exports, imports and net exports variables and the 
denominator is the MSFE of benchmark models, the same as those used in the second column. 
3PRF forecasts performs better than autoregressive benchmarks by at least 26 percent. In 
comparison with ARDL models, 3PRF forecasts perform at least as well in short-horizons and 
significantly better in longer horizons. 3PRF forecasts that use both capital flow and trade variables 
outperform 3PRF forecasts that only use capital flow variables.  
Table 2-5 displays the comparison between 3PRF out-of-sample forecasts and benchmark 
forecasts. In forecast horizons of up to a year, out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts perform remarkably 
better than AR benchmark models. They outperform autoregressive models by at least 14 percent. 
At longer horizons, 3PRF forecasts only marginally outperform AR models.  
Our results show that 3PRF forecasts outperform ARDL models regardless of forecast 
horizons. However, when ARDL models are well-specified their MSFEs are close to MSFEs of 
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3PRF forecasts. The use of 3PRF on capital flow variables seem to pay off as it results in lower 
MSFEs in most cases. 3PRF forecasts that use both capital flow and trade variables perform better 
than 3PRF forecasts that only rely on capital flow variables in all forecasting horizons. 
2.6. Comparison of 3PRF and Principal Components Forecasts 
In this section, we present MSFE ratios where 3PRF forecasts are compared with principal 
components forecasts. We use the following ARDL framework to incorporate principal 
components into our forecast: 
B+C[[ = \ + ∑ ]^B+P^
_2P2
^Z- ∑ a^, )Öà2,+P^
_gP2
^Z- + @+C[
[                                                                   (2.13) 
6âH is the first principle component extracted from the associated capital flow variables included 
in each model. 
Table 2-6 shows the comparison between in-sample 3PRF forecasts and principal 
components ones. In-sample 3PRF forecasts with capital flow and trade variables outperform 
principal components models by at least 7 percent in shorter horizons forecasts and 19 percent in 
longer horizons. Table 2-7 illustrates the comparison between out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts and 
principal components models. Out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts using capital flow and trade variables 
perform significantly better than principal components models especially in shorter horizons. Out-
of-sample 3PRF forecasts outperform principal components forecasts by at least 18 percent in 
shorter horizons and 10 percent in longer horizons. 
2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter aims to forecast US GDP growth using disaggregated financial accounts data. All 
studies using a large number of predictors to forecast US GDP have one thing in common, they all 
use time series that mainly consider domestic variables. Although they include trade series such 
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as exports and imports, they seem to have overlooked foreign investment variables. Therefore, we 
aim to bridge that gap by examining whether including capital flow variables improve the 
conventional autoregressive benchmark forecasts of US GDP. 
We use disaggregated capital flow series from 1991 Q4 to 2017 Q1 that are reported in 
United States financial accounts and incorporate capital flow variables into our forecasts by using 
3PRF, the new dimension reduction technique introduced by Kelly and Pruitt (2015). We evaluate 
3PRF forecasts by using multiple benchmark models and use the MSFE metric to compare 3PRF 
forecasts with benchmark forecasts. 
We found that 3PRF forecasts, both in-sample and out-of-sample, outperform AR forecasts 
significantly regardless of forecasting horizons. The only exception is the out-of-sample forecast 
of eight quarters ahead where 3PRF only marginally performs better than AR benchmarks. In 
comparison to ARDL models, in-sample 3PRF forecasts perform noticeably better in longer 
horizons. Our results show that 3PRF forecasts outperform ARDL models in majority of cases, 
although their margins are slim when ARDL models are well-specified. In-sample and out-of-
sample 3PRF forecasts with capital flow and trade variables perform better than benchmark models 
in all forecasting horizons. Moreover, 3PRF in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts using capital 
flow and trade variables outperform principal components models regardless of the forecasting 
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Table 2-1-Description of capital inflow variables 
Capital inflow variables Brief description 
SDR allocations Federal government; special drawing rights (SDR) allocations 
Net interbank  Net interbank transactions with banks in foreign countries 
US checkable deposits and currency US checkable deposits and currency  
US time deposits US total time and savings deposits including negotiable certificates of deposit 
Money market fund shares US money market mutual fund shares 
Security repurchased agreements 
Security repurchased agreements including transactions with deposit-taking institutions excluding 
the central bank, deposits, of which resale agreement. Also, transactions with other financial 
institutions excluding general government, loans, of which: resale agreements. Level is calculated 
as the previous level plus the unadjusted flow. 
Open market paper Commercial paper and other securities, short term debt securities. 
Treasury bills Treasury bills and certificates 
Other Treasury securities Other Treasury securities, including Treasury Bonds and Notes and excluding Treasury bills and certificates.  
Agency and GSE backed securities Agency-and GSE- (Government-Sponsored Enterprises) backed securities 
Municipal securities Municipal securities including state and local government securities. 
US corporate bonds Corporate and foreign bonds including corporate bonds issued by Netherlands Antillean Financial subsidiaries of US corporations. 
Loans to US corporate business US nonfinancial business loans including loans secured by real estate and commercial and industrial loans. 
US corporate equities US corporate equities 
Mutual fund shares 
US mutual fund shares excluding estimated holding of ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds), REITs 
(Real Estate Investment Trusts) and hedge fund, private equity and limited partner private fund 
shares 
Trade receivables Trade receivables including trade credit and advances 
Foreign direct investment in US Foreign direct investment in the US at current cost 




Table 2-2- Description of capital outflow variables 
Capital outflow variables Brief description 
US official reserve assets US official reserve assets including SDRs holding, reserve position in IMF and other US reserve assets 
US private deposits US private deposits, including short-term and long-term negotiable certificates of deposit 
Security repurchase agreements 
Security repurchased agreements including transactions with deposit-taking institutions excluding 
the central bank, deposits, of which resale agreement. Also, transactions with other financial 
institutions excluding general government, loans, of which: resale agreements. Level is calculated 
as the previous level plus the unadjusted flow. 
Commercial paper Commercial paper issued by financial and nonfinancial firms 
Bonds Long-term and short-term securities less negotiable certificates of deposits and commercial paper 
Depository institution loans Depository institution loans to foreign official institutions, foreign banks and foreigners other than foreign official institutions and foreign banks 
Other loans and advances 
US government loans excluding capital subscriptions and contributions to international financial 
institutions and the IMF, customer’s liability on acceptances outstanding to commercial banking 
and other loans and advances due from foreign addressees. 
Trade payables Trade credit and advances 
US direct investment abroad US direct investment abroad including Netherlands Antillean subsidiaries at current cost 
US equity in IBRD Capital subscriptions and contributions to international financial institutions 
Nonofficial foreign currencies Nonofficial US currencies  
Investment by holding companies Net transactions due to holding companies 
Market value of foreign equities 
 held by US residents 
Foreign corporate equities including foreign investment fund shares 
Source: Financial Accounts of the United States from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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Table 2-3- Descriptive Statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
US GDP 2.48 7.48 -8.54 2.39 
Total capital inflow 0.52 2.02 -1.02 0.56 
Total capital outflow 0.48 2.49 -2.63 0.93 
Exports 3.13 25.71 -41.91 10.35 
Imports 3.94 26.81 -66.61 12.17 
Net exports 13.65 235.12 -136.63 47.71 
US Assets held by foreigners 
SDR allocations 5.80 798.33 -30.17 79.94 
Net interbank  89.99 9353.03 -8889.53 3269.61 
US checkable deposits currency 6.49 65.08 -31.96 11.35 
US time deposits 7.80 460.46 -111.87 49.96 
Money market fund shares 14.33 80.27 -17.85 18.70 
Security repurchased agreements 12.15 273.64 -195.66 59.59 
Open market paper 8.35 170.70 -137.58 44.43 
Treasury bills 5.29 162.05 -82.52 34.50 
Other Treasury securities 8.83 36.26 -41.24 13.05 
Agency and GSE backed securities 9.27 81.82 -45.66 21.02 
Municipal securities 12.40 77.34 -20.57 15.88 
US corporate bonds 8.91 53.45 -50.27 14.10 
Loans to US corporate business -0.16 97.35 -73.75 30.05 
US corporate equities 10.17 73.12 -102.52 32.10 
Mutual fund shares 19.58 275.13 -113.88 47.68 
Trade receivables 4.16 64.46 -105.60 25.26 
Foreign direct investment in US 6.08 55.24 -19.87 9.00 
Foreign assets held by US residents 
US official reserve assets 0.15 224.67 -54.92 30.85 
US private deposits -0.33 87.03 -62.82 24.43 
Security repurchase agreements 53.30 4796.48 -226.97 476.03 
Commercial paper 4.38 138.51 -178.44 38.33 
Bonds 8.83 147.61 -54.01 23.94 
Depository institution loans 2.85 40.16 -68.88 18.10 
Other loans and advances -3.28 160.88 -35.91 20.98 
Trade payables 2.13 114.33 -54.54 26.30 
US direct investment abroad 6.77 34.99 -14.73 6.95 
US equity in IBRD 2.44 13.85 -2.15 3.37 
Nonofficial foreign currencies 4.98 1395.02 -637.81 225.19 
Investment by holding companies 7.68 7953.17 -7731.56 1112.61 
Market value of foreign equities 11.36 101.60 -112.52 38.35 




Table 2-4- In-sample 3PRF forecasts of US GDP growth 
MSFE ratios 3PRF-capital 
inflow only (1) 
MSFE ratios 3PRF-capital inflow 
and outflow (2) 
MSFE ratios 3PRF-capital inflow, 
outflow and trade (3) 
h=1 
AR (1) 0.78 AR (1) 0.75 AR (1) 0.70 
AR (4) 0.82 AR (4) 0.79 AR (4) 0.74 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.86 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.85 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.80 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.97 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.99 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.92 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.88 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.91 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.85 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.97 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 1.03 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.97 
h=2 
AR (1) 0.79 AR (1) 0.73 AR (1) 0.71 
AR (4) 0.81 AR (4) 0.75 AR (4) 0.72 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.90 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.85 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.82 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 1.00 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.97 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.93 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.80 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.86 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.83 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.90 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.98 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.94 
h=4 
AR (1) 0.72 AR (1) 0.67 AR (1) 0.65 
AR (4) 0.72 AR (4) 0.68 AR (4) 0.66 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.80 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.75 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.74 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.87 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.87 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.85 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.73 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.75 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.74 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.76 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.83 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.81 
h=8 
AR (1) 0.79 AR (1) 0.75 AR (1) 0.70 
AR (4) 0.80 AR (4) 0.76 AR (4) 0.71 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.81 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.77 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.73 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.85 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.91 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.85 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.82 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.90 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.84 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.91 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 1.00 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.94 





Table 2-5- Out-of-sample 3PRF forecasts of US GDP growth  
MSFE ratios 3PRF-capital 
inflow only (1) 
MSFE ratios 3PRF-capital inflow 
and outflow (2) 
MSFE ratios 3PRF- capital inflow, 
outflow and trade (3) 
h=1 
AR (1) 0.86 AR (1) 0.81 AR (1) 0.74 
AR (4) 0.81 AR (4) 0.76 AR (4) 0.69 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.98 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.91 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.83 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.89 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.83 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.76 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 1.00 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.98 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.89 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.94 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.78 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.72 
h=2 
AR (1) 0.84 AR (1) 0.87 AR (1) 0.81 
AR (4) 0.72 AR (4) 0.74 AR (4) 0.70 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.91 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.92 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.86 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.78 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.80 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.75 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.93 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.99 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.93 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.75 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.75 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.71 
h=4 
AR (1) 0.79 AR (1) 0.81 AR (1) 0.78 
AR (4) 0.72 AR (4) 0.74 AR (4) 0.71 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.85 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.84 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.81 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.74 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.73 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.70 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.81 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.86 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.82 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.76 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.65 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.63 
h=8 
AR (1) 0.96 AR (1) 0.95 AR (1) 0.91 
AR (4) 0.95 AR (4) 0.94 AR (4) 0.90 
ARDL (1,1) inflow 0.97 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.95 ARDL (1,1,1) flows 0.90 
ARDL (4,4) inflow 0.75 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.73 ARDL (4,4,4) flows 0.70 
ARDL (1,1) net trade 0.99 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.93 ARDL (1,1,1) trade 0.89 
ARDL (4,4) net trade 0.99 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.67 ARDL (4,4,4) trade 0.65 




Table 2-6- Comparison of in-sample forecasts of 3PRF and principal components 
MSFE ratios1 3PRF-capital 
inflow only (1) 
MSFE ratios2 3PRF-capital inflow 
and outflow (2) 
MSFE ratios3 3PRF- capital inflow, 
outflow and trade (3) 
h=1 
ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.79 ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.96 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.89 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.92 ARDL (4,4) PC1 1.03 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.93 
h=2 
ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.94 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.92 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.83 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.98 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.96 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.86 
h=4 
ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.78 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.77 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.71 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.83 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.81 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.75 
h=8 
ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.79 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.76 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.70 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.92 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.83 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.81 
Note: Full sample is 1991Q4-2017Q1. PC1 means lags of the first principal component was included in the model. Therefore, ARDL (4,4) PC1 represents 
the model with 4 lags of US GDP and 4 lags of the first principal component. 
1 The numerator contains MSFE of principal components using only capital inflow variables 
2 The numerator contains MSFE of principal components using both capital inflow and capital outflow variables 





Table 2-7- Comparison of out-of-sample forecasts of 3PRF and principal components 
MSFE ratios1 3PRF-capital 
inflow only (1) 
MSFE ratios2 3PRF-capital inflow 
and outflow (2) 
MSFE ratios3 3PRF- capital inflow, 
outflow and trade (3) 
h=1 
ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.94 ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.93 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.81 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.70 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.86 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.71 
h=2 
ARDL (1,1) PC1 0.89 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.94 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.82 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.79 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.74 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.73 
h=4 
ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.81 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.85 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.77 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.92 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.81 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.70 
h=8 
ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.94 ARDL (1,1) PC1  1.01 ARDL (1,1) PC1  0.90 
ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.70 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.88 ARDL (4,4) PC1 0.67 
Note: Full sample is 1991Q4-2017Q1. Recursive procedure starts out-of-sample forecasts halfway through the sample. PC1 means lags of the first principal 
component was included in the model. Therefore, ARDL (4,4) PC1 represents the model with 4 lags of US GDP and 4 lags of the first principal component. 
1 The numerator contains MSFE of principal components using only capital inflow variables 
2 The numerator contains MSFE of principal components using both capital inflow and capital outflow variables 
3 The numerator contains MSFE of principal components using capital inflow, capital outflow and trade variables 
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Chapter 3:  Foreign Portfolio Investment and the Real 
Economy in the United Kingdom 
3.1. Introduction 
Foreign investment in the UK reached over $10 trillion at the end of 2016. The share of 
portfolio inflow has increased from less than 20 percent in the mid 1980s to the current level of 37 
percent. The capital flow literature focuses on emerging economies, and a limited number of 
studies concentrate on how foreign investment affects advanced economies. The first chapter’s 
results show that shocks to portfolio investment and its components have positive and significant 
impact on US GDP in the long-run. This chapter studies the effect of portfolio investment and its 
components on UK GDP. There are two reasons for choosing the UK economy, first, the United 
Kingdom’s economy is significantly smaller than the United States’, so the concern that our results 
might be driven due to the size of the US economy can be addressed. Second, the UK foreign 
investment dataset goes back to the mid-1980s, so a time series analysis similar to the one 
presented for the US economy is possible.  
This chapter uses structural VAR models to study the dynamic effects of portfolio 
investment on the UK economy. There are two benefits to this method. Firstly, it considers the 
feedback effects between the variables of interest. Secondly, it facilitates the study of the long-
term effects of shocks to portfolio inflow variables on UK economy. The chapter also uses factor 
augmented VAR (FAVAR) method to investigate whether the inclusion of UK monetary policy 
component would change the main results. In addition to UK GDP, it studies the long-term effects 
of foreign portfolio investment on UK domestic investment and consumption. 
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The primary results show that an unexpected increase in portfolio investment increases UK 
GDP by 0.4 percentage points after two years. Furthermore, the structural VAR impulse responses 
illustrate that positive shocks to equity and debt inflow have positive and negative effects on UK 
GDP, respectively. A one standard deviation shock to equity inflow increases UK GDP by 1.0 
percentage point after five years. In contrast, a one standard deviation shock to debt inflow 
decreases UK GDP by -0.3 percentage points after 20 quarters. Moreover, the FAVAR shows that 
the effects of shocks to equity and debt inflow on UK GDP are similar to the primary results even 
after the inclusion of the UK monetary policy factors. Furthermore, UK investment’s and 
consumption’s responses to equity and debt inflow shocks are qualitatively similar to UK GDP’s 
responses. However, UK investment’s and consumption’s responses are larger in magnitude. 
Finally, a debt inflow shock shows a negative effect on the UK GDP and investment in the post-
financial crisis period while it shows no impact in the pre-financial crisis sample. 
The primary contribution of this chapter is to empirically test whether portfolio investment 
benefits the UK economy. The first chapter finds that shocks to portfolio inflow and its components 
have positive and significant effects on US GDP in the long-run. Similar to the US case, the 
estimates show positive long-term effects for portfolio and equity inflow on the UK economy. 
Contrary to the US case, the debt inflow has no effect on UK GDP in the long term when the pre-
financial crisis period is considered. Furthermore, this chapter uses structural VAR models instead 
of single equation instrumental variable approach commonly used in the literature (i.e. Blanchard 
et al., 2016; Durham, 2003; and Prasad et al., 2007) and estimates the dynamic effects of capital 
inflow on UK real economy. This chapter also examines the concern over omitted variable bias by 
adding the UK monetary policy factor to the core VAR variables using factor augmented VAR 
models. Our main results hold even after accounting for the impact of UK monetary policy. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 3.2, we present the empirical 
background on international capital flows. Section 3.3 describes structural VARs and identification 
strategies used to study dynamic effects of foreign investment and its subcategories on UK GDP. 
In section 3.4, we describe the data sources used in this study. Section 3.5 presents the chapter’s 
primary results by displaying impulse responses of structural VARs. In section 3.6, we use 
FAVAR method to include the UK monetary policy factor that captures the common factor of the 
five UK interest rates. In section 3.7, we present the impulse responses of structural VAR for UK 
investment and consumption. The study concludes in section 3.8. 
3.2. Empirical Background on International Capital Flows 
This section discusses multiple aspects of international capital flows. Section 3.2.1 explains 
different capital flow variables used in the literature. We compare different components of foreign 
investment in the UK and how they have changed over time in section 3.2.2 Finally, we describe 
the recent literature about the effect of capital flow on growth in section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1. Capital Flows; Net versus gross 
Different measures of capital inflow have been used in the literature. Current account 
deficit was the main measurement used in earlier studies. For example, Higgins and Klitgaard 
(1998) use US current account deficit to measure US capital inflow. They claim that US current 
account deficit associated with net capital inflow promotes growth in the United States. They 
pinpoint the benefits of foreign capital inflow, which promote domestic investment despite a 
decline in private savings. Obstfeld (2012) highlights the relationship between current account 
imbalances and global financial instability and emphasizes the importance of considering both 




There are two measurements of capital inflow, net and gross, used in the literature. Ferreira 
and Laux (2009) and Aizenman et al. (2010), for example, use net capital inflow. Ferreira and 
Laux (2009) use net portfolio flows and show that openness to portfolio flows have positive effects 
on economic growth. Aizenman et al. (2010) use net FDI inflows, net portfolio inflows and net 
bank lending inflows and study the effect of external financing on output volatility in developing 
countries. They show that higher net portfolio inflows and net bank lending inflows increase the 
likelihood of experiencing output volatility. 
There are also studies that either include both net and gross capital inflows or only focus 
on gross inflows. Broner et al. (2013) study financial crises and gross capital flows. They compare 
gross and net capital flow and show that the former is more volatile and pro-cyclical. Forbes and 
Warnock (2012) differentiate gross capital inflow and outflow in their study and explain that 
domestic and foreign investors face different exposures to domestic exchange rate and have 
different access to liquidity, so their response to shocks can be different. In this chapter, we follow 
recent literature by using gross capital inflow variables. 
3.2.2. UK Capital Flows 
Total foreign investment in the UK reached over $10 trillion by the end of the fourth quarter 
of 2016. The following figures show how foreign investment and its components have changed 
over time.  
Figure 3-1 shows changes in components of foreign investments in the UK over time. 
There are three facts to observe. Firstly, bank lending inflow is the main component of gross capital 
inflow in the UK. Bank credit has accounted for almost 50 percent of total foreign investment in 
the UK between 2010 to 2016 compared to more than 65 percent between 1984 to 2000. Secondly, 
unlike the US case, where portfolio investment is the dominant component of gross capital inflow, 
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portfolio investment in the UK accounts for less than 35 percent of total foreign investment. 
Finally, bank credit inflow peaked on the first quarter of 2008 reaching over $8.5 trillion before 
declining. Net foreign investment in the UK had an upward trend before it reached its peak at $700 
billion in the third quarter of 2014. It has declined ever since, however, and in the fourth quarter 
of 2016 it was -418 billion dollars, indicating a net capital outflow.  
Figure 3-2 illustrates the components of portfolio investment in the UK by plotting debt 
and equity inflows as percentage of portfolio investment. The debt share declined constantly from 
90 percent in 1984 and reached its lowest at 33 percent in the first quarter of 2000. It has gone up 
ever since reaching 61 percent in the end of fourth quarter of 2016.  
Equity and debt are both in the liabilities section of financial accounts. They are, however, 
very different in nature. Equity measures the value of UK stocks owned by foreigners which can 
be claimed at any time. Moreover, all stock holders face profits and losses as a result of fluctuations 
in stock prices and dividends. Debt portion includes debt securities held by central bank, 
government and deposit taking corporations and their associated interest rates that are due at a 
given time in the future. 
3.2.3. Capital Flows, Growth and Comparison with This Study 
Blanchard et al. (2016) extend the Mundell Fleming model to study the effect of capital 
inflow on economic growth. They explain the difference between what theory suggests and what 
policy makers in emerging economies believe. According to the theory, higher capital inflow into 
a country with flexible exchange rate policy, puts upward pressure on domestic currency. Currency 
appreciation deteriorates current account, resulting in lower GDP if the money supply is fixed. 
Emerging economies’ experiences, however, show that an ongoing inflow of foreign capital puts 
downward pressure on domestic interest rates elevating investment and output. 
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There are concerns regarding capital flow. Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and De la 
Torre, Didier and Pienknagura (2012) describe the common fears behind capital controls as fear 
of currency appreciation, fear of hot money, fear of large inflows, fear of loss of monetary 
autonomy and fear of instability and uncertainty associated with capital flow movements. Reinhart, 
Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) study the relationship between global cycles in capital flows, 
commodity prices and sovereign debt defaults from 1815 to 2015.  They show that both capital 
inflow and commodity prices reached their lowest point in 1999 and peaked in 2011, which was 
followed by an acute bust. The “double bust”, as authors call it, was associated with a reduction 
of 2 percentage points in IMF’s forecast for 2015 growth in emerging economies. They also find 
that sovereign default risk increased worldwide at the end of global capital flow surges. 
Durham (2003) studies the effect of foreign portfolio investment and bank lending on 
economic growth by examining 88 countries from 1977 to 2000. The author shows that one 
percentage point increases in the ratio of portfolio investments to GDP and foreign bank lending 
as percentage of GDP reduce average growth rates by 1.4 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. 
The author mentions that his results might be affected by simultaneity bias given the use of 
simultaneous equations. We use structural VAR where each variable is a linear function of lags of 
itself and lags of all other variables. This method enables us to study the impact of structural shocks 
to foreign portfolio inflow and its components, equity and debt, on the UK economy. 
Prasad et al. (2007) show that nonindustrial countries that relied less on foreign capital 
have grown faster. They argue that the main reason developing economies struggle to absorb the 
benefits of foreign capital flow is their underdeveloped financial markets. They suggest that 
developing countries open their capital market slowly and cautiously by welcoming the type of 
capital that their economies are capable to absorb while being more vigilant toward less absorbable 
82 
 
foreign capital. Their estimations show that if current account balance improves by one percentage 
point, economic growth increases by around 0.1 percentage point.  
Additionally, Prasad et al. (2007) claim that developing economies struggle to absorb the 
benefits of financial liberalization due to their underdeveloped financial infrastructure. That 
highlights the importance of studying the impact of capital flows on developed countries like the 
United Kingdom. By looking at the effect of foreign capital on developed economies like the US 
and the UK, developing countries can project the benefits of financial development against its 
potential costs and make informed decisions on financial liberalization. 
Warnock and Warnock (2009) examine the effect of US government bonds purchased by 
foreigners on a 10-year Treasury yield. They show that if foreigners did not purchase US 
government bonds for a year, long-term rates would have been 80 basis points higher. The chapter 
concentrates on the effect of US government bonds held by foreigners whereas we study the sub-
categories of foreign investments in the UK. Their dataset only covers the period prior to the recent 
financial crisis. Our sample, however, includes pre- and post- financial crisis periods. 
Ferreira and Laux (2009) look at 50 advanced and less-developed countries from 1988 to 
2000 and study the effect of portfolio flows on their growth. They find a positive relationship 
between openness to portfolio flows and economic growth. They show that the positive effects are 
greater for less-developed countries. They estimate that advanced and developing countries’ GDPs 
increase by 0.2 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively, in response to a one percent increase in the 
lagged net sale of local equities by local residents. Their main focus is the effect of net portfolio 
flows on growth. Our study, however, concentrates on the effect of gross portfolio inflow and its 
components. Moreover, our sample contains post-financial crises period.  
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Aizenman et al. (2013) investigate the impact of international capital flows on economic 
growth. They study 100 countries between 1990 and 2010 and find a significant and stable 
relationship between FDI and growth. The relationships between portfolio flows and growth, 
however, were found to be less stable. They show that the growth rate of GDP per capita increased 
by 1.8 percent following a one standard deviation increase in FDI inflow. Furthermore, the authors 
show that one standard deviation increases of FDI inflow, equity investment and short-term debt 
during pre-crisis period increased GDP per capita growth by 0.9, 0.4 and zero percentage points, 
respectively.  
Blanchard et al. (2015) extend the Mundell Fleming model to study the impact of capital 
inflow on economic growth. They divide capital inflow into bond flows and non-bond flows and 
show why there is a difference between what theory suggests and what policymakers believe. Their 
estimations illustrate that increases in non-bond flows and bond-flows have expansionary and 
contractionary effects on output, respectively. To tackle the endogeneity issue, they use 
instrumental variables. In this study, we use structural VAR models where all variables are 
assumed to be endogenous.  
3.3. Structural VAR Models 
The relationship between domestic GDP and foreign investment have been studied with 
causality in both directions. There are studies such as De Vita and Kyaw (2008) that suggest 
domestic GDP is one of the main determinants of foreign investment in a country. There are also 
studies similar to Blanchard et al. (2016) that show capital inflow can have a significant impact on 
domestic economy. Therefore, it is important to consider feedback effects. Thus, we use structural 
VAR models where all variables are assumed to be endogenous. These models facilitate the study 
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of dynamic effects of foreign investment shocks on UK economy. The exogenous shocks in our 
models are identified so they are independent of each other. 
Sims (1980) introduced the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model as a system of linear 
multivariate regressions where all variables are treated as endogenous and each variable is a 
function of the lagged values of all other endogenous variables in the system. Our reduced form 
VAR models are defined as follows: 
!" = $% + $'!"(' + $)!"() + ⋯+ $+!"(+ + ,"                                                                    (3.1) 
Where  !- = (/0-, /2-, … /4-)6 is a vector of 7 variables at time 8, $9 is a (7 × 1) vector of 
constants, $0, $2 and $< are (7 × 7) matrices of coefficients and ,- is a (7 × 1) vector of residuals 




We use the growth rate of all variables in our VARs to comply with stationarity 
requirement. Also, all VAR models include 4 lags which seem to be appropriate for quarterly data. 
Structural VAR is then defined as follows: 
O%!" = P + ∑ OR!"(R + S"
T
RU'                                                                                                     (3.2) 
Where !- = (/0-, /2- ,… /4-)6 is a vector of 7 variables at time 8 and S- represents the vector of 
structural innovations that are serially and mutually uncorrelated. If we left multiply the equation 
(3.2) by O9(0, we obtain the reduced form VAR that would have a similar format as equation (3.1). 
O9
(0 has a recursive structure which is designed to decompose the reduced form errors ,- to 
exogenous structural shocks S-. 
," = O%
('S"                                                                                                                                  (3.3) 
To estimate a structural VAR, we need to start with the reduced-form VAR and solve for structural 
parameters to find matrix O9. 
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After identifying the structural VAR, we find impulse responses to each structural shock. 
This can be achieved by transforming the structural VAR, so each endogenous variable is defined 
as the sum of associated structural shocks: 
!" = V + ∑ WRO('S"(R
X
RU%                                                                                                           (3.4) 
Where V = $(Y)('$% and WZ represents (7 × 7) coefficient matrix of reduced form errors 
," in the VMA format.14	  
The recent development in the VAR literature is determining whether the included 
variables contain sufficient information. Forni and Gambetti (2014) highlight the importance of 
information sufficiency in structural VAR models. They introduce two tests that can examine any 
structural VAR and whether they contain sufficient information to provide meaningful results for 
all the structural shocks. They assume that there is a state space that represents the economy, and 
they suggest estimating the state variables by applying principal components method on a large 
number of macroeconomic variables. The authors’ second step is to test whether the principal 
components Granger cause the VAR variables, and, only if the Granger causality hypothesis is not 
rejected, the VAR variables contain sufficient information. Testing the information sufficiency of 
the VAR variables will be used for the following research. 
For each model we first explain !-, the variables included, and then show the recursive 
structure used to decompose the reduced form errors.  
3.3.1. Model 1: UK GDP and Net Capital Inflow 
This model studies the effect of net foreign investment in the UK on UK GDP. UK GDP 
is UK GDP growth and net capital inflow is the growth of net foreign investment in the UK. Net 
                                               
14 $(Y) is defined as $(Y) = (\4 − $0Y − $2Y2 −⋯− $<Y<) where Y, Y2,… , Y< are lag operators 
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foreign investment in the UK equals the gross UK assets held by foreigners less the gross foreign 
assets held by UK residents. Our structural VAR follows equation (3.2) and the decomposition of 















We assume that UK GDP growth only responds to net capital inflow innovations with a 
lag. The effect of capital inflow on domestic output derives from two channels: exchange rate and 
interest rate. Exchange rate channel concentrates on the effect of higher capital inflow on the 
demand for local currency, which creates an upward pressure on British Pound (GBP) in our case. 
Appreciation of GBP means British goods and services are more expensive abroad while foreign 
goods and services become cheaper in the UK. Thus, UK balance of payment deteriorates causing 
UK output to decline. 
The interest rate channel explains that the flow of foreign capital into the UK increases the 
demand for the UK assets, which creates a downward pressure on domestic interest rates. Reduced 
domestic interest rates lower the cost of borrowing in the UK and promote investment and output. 
These effects will not be instant. Thus, we assume that changes in capital inflow will not affect 
UK GDP contemporaneously. Net capital inflow innovations not explained by UK GDP shocks 
will be included on net capital inflow shocks. The assumption that UK output does not respond to 
capital flow innovations contemporaneously holds throughout this chapter. 
3.3.2. Model 2: UK GDP, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the UK, UK Portfolio Assets Held 
by Foreigners and Foreign Bank Lending. 
In this model, we study how components of UK assets held by foreign investors affect UK 
GDP. FDI inflow measures FDI growth, portfolio inflow equals the growth of portfolio investments 
held by foreigners and bank credit inflow measures the growth of foreign bank lending. 
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UK GDP growth does not respond to capital inflow innovations, including FDI, portfolio 
and bank credit innovations, within the same quarter. We assume that they only affect UK GDP 
growth with a lag. We also assume FDI inflow does not respond to portfolio innovations and bank 
credit innovations within the same period. This assumption is in line with reality since FDI is 
considered as a long-term investment with minimal fluctuations in response to temporary changes. 
Therefore, we assume any portfolio or bank credit innovations only affect FDI with a lag. 
However, fairly liquid portions of capital inflow, portfolio investments and bank credits, 
are more responsive to shocks. Thus, we allow the portfolio and bank credit inflow to respond to 
each other’s innovations contemporaneously. This assumption means oÄ = oÄ which means 
portfolio and bank credit inflows respond to each other’s shocks contemporaneously and with 
equal magnitudes.  
3.3.3. Model 3: UK GDP, UK Equity Portfolio and UK Debt Portfolio Held by Foreigners 
In this model, we focus on the effects of shocks to equity and debt inflow on UK GDP. 
Equity inflow measures the growth rate of UK equity and investment fund shares held by foreign 
investors and debt inflow is the growth rate of UK debt held by foreign investors. Equity and 
investment fund shares and debt securities are held by the central bank, deposit-taking 
corporations, general government and other sectors including financial corporations. The structural 






















We assume that UK GDP does not respond to equity inflow or debt inflow innovations 
contemporaneously. We allow debt and equity inflow to respond to each other’s innovations 
contemporaneously by assuming o2 = o2. The equity and bond markets operate on a daily basis 
and investors have access to daily information such as interest rates, yields and prices. Therefore, 
our assumption is in line with reality, where investors can observe unexpected changes and respond 
to them swiftly. 
3.4. Data 
The data source used for this chapter is IMF, Balance of Payments and International 
Investment Position Statistics (BOP/IIP) for the United Kingdom. This source provides quarterly 
data on the levels of various UK assets held by foreigners and foreign assets held by UK residents 
at the end of each quarter. This source contains the main categories of foreign investments, foreign 
direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and bank credit, as well as their components, equity 
and debt. That allows us to study the effect of foreign portfolio investment and its components, 
equity and debt, on the UK real GDP.  
In addition to foreign investment variables, we collect UK nominal GDP, UK total 
consumption, UK fixed capital formation, UK CPI and Sterling exchange rate against US dollar 
from Office for National Statistics. All variables are corrected for inflation. Foreign investment 
variables that are reported in US dollars have been converted to British Pound before being 
corrected for inflation. All variables have unit roots so to comply with stationarity condition of 
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VAR models, we use their stationary growth rates.15 Descriptive statistics of all variables are 
presented in Table 3-1. 
3.5. Primary Empirical Results 
This section presents impulse responses for each structural VAR model introduced in 
section 3.3. We only report the accumulated responses as they represent the long-term effects on 
UK GDP. The first row of each panel presents the effect of capital flow variables on UK GDP. All 
variables entering our models are in growth rate format, so the unit of each vertical axis is 
percentage point. We report our results for two sets of samples. Panel A includes the full sample 
from 1984 Q1 to 2016 Q1 and Panel B contains a sub-sample from 1993 Q1 to 2016 Q1. The 
shorter sample covers the post- Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) when the British Pound 
exchange rate began to float. 
British government left ERM on September 16, 1992 following two failed attempts, on the 
same day, to maintain the Pound Sterling‘s parity by increasing the base interest rate to 15%.16 
Söderlind (2000) shows how market expectations changed in response to the events before and 
after UK left ERM. He highlights the fact that events leading to September 16, 1992 created an 
expectation of high interest rates in the market. The author’s estimations illustrate that the 
introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992 reduced both uncertainty and long-term interest 
rates. He shows that the UK chancellor’s speech on November 12, 1992 clarified the future of UK 
monetary policy and narrowed the distribution of future UK interest rates. 
                                               
15 Unit root test results for all variables are reported Appendix 4 





Figure 3-3 displays impulse responses of the first model that studies the effect of net 
foreign investment in the UK on UK GDP. Panel A shows that a positive one standard deviation 
shock to net capital inflow has a negative effect of -0.2 percentage points on the UK GDP in the 
long-run. The effect of net capital inflow on UK GDP becomes positive when we consider 1993 
Q1 to 2016 Q1 sample. Panel B illustrates that a one standard deviation shock to net capital inflow 
increases UK GDP by 0.1 percentage points after two years. The negative impacts shown in panel 
A might be the results of events prior to leaving the ERM. Both effects are statistically 
insignificant, however. 
Figure 3-4 displays responses of the second model and illustrates UK GDP responses to 
shocks to FDI, portfolio and bank credit inflows. Impulse responses from both samples show that 
a positive shock to portfolio inflow has a positive effect on UK output. A one standard deviation 
increase in portfolio inflow raises UK GDP by 0.4 percentage points after eight quarters. A positive 
shock to bank credit inflow has a negative effect of -0.2 percentage points on UK GDP after two 
years when the full sample is considered. The negative effect becomes slightly larger in the shorter 
sample shown in panel B. Our results are in line with Durham (2003)’s, where foreign bank lending 
showed to have a negative effect on growth.  
Figure 3-5 portrays impulse responses of UK GDP to equity and debt inflow shocks as 
described in the third SVAR. A positive shock to equity inflow has a positive effect on UK output. 
Our full sample analysis shows that a one standard deviation shock to portfolio equity inflow 
increases UK GDP by 0.7 percentage points after eight quarters. The effect of equity inflow shock 
on UK GDP in our shorter sample remains positive but shrinks in magnitude. We find that a 
positive shock to debt inflow has a negative impact on UK output in the long-run when we consider 
the full sample. Panel B shows that the effect of debt inflow on UK GDP becomes zero when we 
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consider the shorter sample. Furthermore, panel C illustrates that a debt inflow shock has no impact 
on UK GDP when the pre-financial crisis period of 1984Q1- 2007Q4 is considered. Our findings 
are in line with Blanchard et al. (2015)’s estimations. They show that one percent increase of 
portfolio equity flows as percentage of GDP increases GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points. They 
also show that debt inflow has a negative impact on growth.  
3.6. Results from Factor Augmented VAR Models 
One of the limitations of VAR approach is that adding new variables to the model increases 
the number of parameters that need to be estimated exponentially. Therefore, we follow the 
conventional method and start with a core VAR and change the variables to study their effects. As 
a result, there might be concerns that our estimates are subjected to omitted variable bias. For 
example, one possible question can be whether the inclusion of interest rates, representing UK 
monetary policy, change our results. This section uses a Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) 
method, similar to the framework used by Bernanke et al. (2005), to include the effects of UK 
monetary policy.  
UK monetary policy has changed significantly during our sample period. Prior to joining 
ERM, Britain had an informal exchange rate target against Deutsche Mark. In October 1990 UK 
officially joined ERM and introduced explicit exchange rate targets against other European 
currencies. Two years later on September 16, 1992, it left ERM as a result of a widespread 
speculative attack on British Pound. UK government’s attempt to maintain Pound parity by 
increasing short term interest rates to 15% failed, and Britain was forced to leave ERM and allow 
its currency to float.  
On October 1992, a new monetary policy with two main components were announced: 
first, interest rates would be set to achieve price stability, an inflation rate within the band of 1 to 
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4%. Second, the Bank of England was given greater roles in setting interest rates. Those 
institutional changes increased the transparency and openness of UK monetary policymaking 
(King, 1997). The Bank of England became independent in May 1997 and the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) became responsible for setting interest rates. It is the responsibility of UK 
government to set the monetary policy by designing the inflation target. Then, it is MPC’s 
responsibility to set interest rates to achieve this inflation target. As a result of these policies, the 
UK inflation rate has remained low.17 
The FAVAR model follows the assumption that UK GDP is an observable slow-moving 
factor, capital inflow variables are observable fast-moving factors and there is one unobservable 
fast-moving factor representing UK monetary policy that is estimated from five UK interest rate 
series. Observable factors are standardized versions of the associated observable variables and the 
unobservable factor is estimated using principal components method as explained by Bernanke et 
al. (2005). 
The FAVAR impulse responses are comparable to VAR impulse responses associated with 
the model (3) as we assume that our core VAR variables are observable. In contrast to the VAR 
impulse responses, the vertical axes in the FAVAR impulse responses represent unit of standard 
deviation as all included factors are standardized. We only show impulse responses of UK GDP 
to unexpected changes in our variables of interest, equity and debt inflow. Thus, to compare the 
magnitude of FAVAR results with SVAR’s, we need to multiply the FAVAR responses by one 
standard deviation of UK GDP, 1.1 percentage points.  
                                               




The FAVAR investigates the effects of shocks to equity and debt inflow on UK GDP. 
Following factors are included: 
!- = (âä	ãåç-, `éèê8/	ê7ëíìî-, ï`ñ8	ê7ëíìî-,óì7`8oò/	ôìíêö/-)6    
UK GDP does not respond to equity, debt and monetary policy innovations within the same 
quarter. Equity and debt inflow respond to each other innovations contemporaneously and in equal 
magnitudes. Following Bernanke et al. (2005) we order the monetary policy factor last so interest 
rate innovations that have not been captured by UK GDP, equity and debt shocks are defined by 
UK monetary policy shocks. The interest rates used to calculate the UK monetary policy factor are 
1 month mean interbank lending rate, 3 month mean interbank lending rate, 3 month Treasury 
bills, 6 month mean interbank lending rate and 1 year mean interbank lending rate. 
 Figure 3-6 shows the effect of equity and debt inflow shocks on UK GDP. A positive one 
standard deviation shock to equity inflow increase UK GDP by 0.7 percentage points after two 
years. Moreover, a positive shock to debt inflow decreases UK GDP by -0.2 percentage points 
after eight quarters. When we consider the smaller sample, the effect of debt inflow on UK GDP 
becomes zero and the positive effect of equity inflow on UK GDP shrinks in magnitude.  
3.7. Effect of Equity and Debt Inflows on GDP Components 
This section studies the effects of equity and debt inflows on the UK’s GDP components, 
consumption and investment. UK investment and consumption datasets were collected from UK 
Economic Accounts: main aggregates. Investment accounts for gross fixed capital formation in 
British Pound at current prices. Consumption includes final consumption of households and non-
profit institutions serving households in British Pound at current prices. It, however, excludes 
general government consumption.  
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Similar to UK GDP, investment and consumption are corrected for inflation using UK CPI. 
This section uses the structural VAR model introduced in section 3.3.3. Similar to the primary 
results, both sections include three sets of results for the full sample, 1984 Q1-2016Q1, shown in 
panel A and shorter sample, 1993Q1-2016Q1, illustrated in panel B as well as Panel C that contains 
the sample 1984Q1-2008Q1 for the UK investment and sample 2009Q1-2016Q4 for the 
consumption case. 
Figure 3-7 shows UK investment impulse responses to equity and debt inflow shocks. An 
unexpected increase in equity and debt inflows have positive and negative effects on UK 
investment, respectively. Panel A illustrates that a one standard deviation shock to equity inflow 
increases UK investment by 1.9 percentage points after two years. It also shows that a one standard 
deviation shock to debt inflow decreases UK investment by -0.1 percentage points after two years. 
Panel B shows that UK investment increases by 1.3 percentage points eight quarters after a positive 
shock to equity inflow. It also displays that a positive one standard deviation shock to debt inflow 
decreases UK investment by -0.6 percentage points after two years. Finally, Panel C shows that a 
debt inflow shock has a positive effect on UK investment in the short-run and zero effect in the 
long-run when the pre-financial crisis period of 1984Q-2008Q1 is considered. 
Figure 3-8 displays impulse responses of UK consumption to unexpected increases in 
equity and debt inflow. Panel A shows that a positive shock to equity inflow increases UK 
consumption by 0.9 percentage points after two years. It also shows that a one standard deviation 
shock to debt inflow decreases UK consumption by -0.6 percentage points after eight quarters. 
Panel B illustrates that a positive one standard deviation shock to equity inflow increase UK 
consumption by 0.7 percentage points after two years. The panel also displays that an unexpected 
increase in debt inflow decreases UK consumption by -0.2 percentage points after eight quarters. 
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Panel C displays that a positive shock to debt inflow has no impact on UK consumption in the 
long-run when we restrict the sample to post-financial crisis period of 2009Q1- 2016Q4.  
The Euro was officially introduced on January 1, 2002, and 12 countries adopted it as their 
legal tender. In order to study the effect of adaptation of the Euro we divide our sample to pre- and 
post- Euro period and repeat our study. The results are qualitatively similar to our full sample 
results presented above. 
3.8. Conclusion 
The first chapter finds that positive shocks to capital inflow have expansionary effects on 
the US economy. It suggests that developing countries can expect similar positive effects in the 
long-run by opening their financial markets. However, an important question arises. Is the positive 
effect of foreign investment specific to the United States or do other developed countries also 
benefit from these positive effects? This chapter aims to answer that question by looking at the 
United Kingdom.  
We use quarterly data on the UK’s foreign investment positions that are available from 
IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics (BOP/IIP). We use 
structural VAR to study the dynamic effect of capital inflow on the UK’s GDP by incorporating 
feedback effects in the models. 
The results show that a one standard deviation shock to portfolio inflow increases UK GDP 
by 0.4 percentage points after two years. Equity inflow is the main force behind that positive effect. 
Unlike the US case, debt inflow shocks have contractionary effects on UK GDP in the long-run. 
Our estimations on the impacts of equity and debt on UK GDP are similar to the results of 
Blanchard et al. (2015). They estimate that one percent increases of portfolio equity inflow and 
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debt inflow increase emerging economies GDP growth by 0.4 and -0.03 percentage points, 
respectively. 
The effect of equity and debt inflow shocks on UK GDP remains positive and negative, 
respectively, even after we control for the effects of UK monetary policy. Furthermore, we study 
the impacts of shocks to equity and debt inflow on components of UK GDP, consumption and 
investment. We find that a one standard deviation shock to equity inflow increases both UK 
consumption and investment. A debt inflow shock shows a negative effect on the UK GDP and 
investment in the post-financial crisis period while it shows no impact in the pre-financial crisis 
sample. 
The results can be helpful to policy makers in emerging countries by providing evidence 
of the benefit to developing their capital markets, especially stock markets. Whereas the positive 
effects of debt inflow might be unique to the US, the expansionary impacts of equity inflow have 
been shown in this chapter as well as other studies like Blanchard et al. (2016), Aizenman et al. 
(2013). By studying the impact of equity inflow on the advanced economies, emerging economies 
can project the effect of foreign investment on their own growth once their financial markets are 
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Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Source Sample # Obs. 
Real GDP growth 0.60 3.76 -3.33 1.10 ONS1 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real investment growth 0.48 9.56 -8.59 3.20 ONS1 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real consumption growth 0.64 3.22 -2.85 0.99 ONS1 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real net capital inflow growth 17.86 2026.57 -1877.00 419.46 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real total capital inflow growth 1.51 12.65 -14.83 4.16 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real total capital outflow growth 1.42 11.91 -15.55 4.38 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real FDI inflow growth  2.01 30.02 -14.25 6.03 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real portfolio inflow growth 2.07 15.50 -18.13 5.78 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real bank credit inflow growth 1.15 12.14 -14.59 4.74 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real portfolio equity inflow growth 3.10 30.15 -25.25 9.86 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
Real portfolio debt inflow growth 1.75 14.80 -19.69 5.04 IMF2 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
1 month interbank lending rate 5.88 15.06 0.31 4.14 BOE3 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
3 month interbank lending rate 5.96 15.19 0.38 4.09 BOE3 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
3 month Treasury bills 5.55 14.52 0.12 3.97 BOE3 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
6 month interbank lending rate 6.03 15.24 0.56 3.99 BOE3 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
1 year interbank lending rate 6.17 15.25 0.78 3.84 BOE3 1984 Q1-2016 Q1 128 
1 The Office for National Statistics 
2 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Position Statistics (BOP/IIP) 
3 Bank of England, interest and exchange rates data 
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Figure 3-1-Components of foreign investments in the UK 
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Figure 3-2-Debt and equity as share of portfolio investment 
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Figure 3-3-Impulse responses for net foreign investment and UK GDP 
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Response of net capital inflow to net capital inflow shock
Accumulated Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 3-4-Impulse responses for FDI, portfolio inflow, bank credit and UK GDP 
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Response of bank credit inflow to bank credit inflow shock
Accumulated Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Response of bank credit inflow to bank credit inflow shock
Accumulated Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 3-5-Impulse responses for equity inflow, debt inflow and UK GDP 
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Response of debt inflow to debt inflow shock
Accumulated Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Accumulated Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 3-6-FAVAR impulse responses for equity inflow, debt inflow and UK GDP 
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Figure 3-7-Impulse responses for equity inflow and debt inflow and UK investment 
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Figure 3-8-Impulse responses for equity inflow and debt inflow and UK consumption 
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U.S. assets held by foreigners 
Foreign Direct Investment Bank Credit Portfolio Investment 
Equity and investment fund shares Debt 
Investment fund shares 
US corporate equity 
Trade receivables 
Net interbank assets 
U.S. checkable deposits 
& currency 
US time deposits 
Security repurchase 
agreements 
Loans to U.S. 
corporate business 
SDR allocations 
US government US corporate debt 
Municipal securities 
Agency and GSE-backed securities 
US corporate bonds 
Treasury securities 
Treasury bills 
Other Treasury securities 
Mutual fund shares 
Money market fund shares 




P-values of unit root tests performed on logarithm of real variables 
Variables ADF Phillips-Perron 
Log of real GDP 0.82 0.85 
Log of real net capital inflow 0.20 0.22 
Log of real capital inflow 0.74 0.75 
Log of real capital outflow 0.96 0.95 
Log of real FDI inflow 0.41 0.12 
Log of real portfolio inflow  0.72 0.76 
Log of real bank credit inflow 0.89 0.89 
Log of real portfolio equity inflow 0.84 0.83 
Log of real portfolio debt inflow 0.62 0.69 
Log of real US corporate debt inflow 0.11 0.11 
Log of real US government debt inflow 0.92 0.92 
 
 
P-values of unit root tests performed on growth of variables  
Variables ADF Phillips-Perron 
Real GDP growth 0.00 0.00 
Real net capital inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real capital inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real capital outflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real FDI inflow growth 0.01 0.00 
Real portfolio inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real bank credit inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real portfolio equity inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real portfolio debt inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Log of real US corporate debt inflow 0.00 0.00 


























Foreign assets held by U.S. residents 
US Direct Investment abroad Bank Credit Portfolio Investment 
Equity and investment fund shares Debt securities 
U.S. equities in IBRD, 
etc. 
Foreign equities 
Depository institution loans 






Investment by holding 
companies 
Other loans and advances 
Bonds Commercial paper 
Loans 




P-values of unit root tests performed on logarithm of real variables 
Variables ADF Phillips-Perron 
Log of real GDP 0.46 0.28 
Log of real investment 0.19 0.18 
Log of real consumption 0.39 0.12 
Log of real net capital inflow 0.16 0.09 
Log of real capital inflow 0.59 0.58 
Log of real capital outflow 0.74 0.74 
Log of real FDI inflow 0.72 0.72 
Log of real portfolio inflow  0.62 0.60 
Log of real bank credit inflow 0.57 0.55 
Log of real portfolio equity inflow 0.03 0.03 
Log of real portfolio debt inflow 0.91 0.92 
 
 
P-values of unit root tests performed on growth of variables 
Variables ADF Phillips-Perron 
Real GDP growth 0.03 0.00 
Real investment growth 0.00 0.00 
Real consumption growth 0.08 0.00 
Real net capital inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real capital inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real capital outflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real FDI inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real portfolio inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real bank credit inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real portfolio equity inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
Real portfolio debt inflow growth 0.00 0.00 
 
 
